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KANT'S
CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY

FOR ENGLISH READERS.

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VOL. I.—PART III.

PRINCIPLES OF THE UNDERSTANDING AND KANT'S IDEALISM.

[CONCLUDING THE VOLUME.]

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CHAPTER XI.

SECOND CHAPTER OF THE ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES.

§ 1. *Of the System of all the Principles of the Pure Understanding.*—So far we have only considered the *general* conditions, which alone justify the transcendental judgment in using the Categories for synthetical judgments. We now proceed to give a systematic sketch of the judgments thus actually produced. Of course, our clue will still be the table of the Categories, since it is *their* relation to experience which constitutes all pure rational cognition.

A priori Principles (lit. *fundamental principles*¹) are not so called, merely because they contain the foundation of others, but also because they themselves are not based on higher and more universal cognitions. Yet this property does not free them from requiring to be proved. Such proof cannot, indeed, be objective, being rather the foundation of all knowledge of its object. But a proof from the subjective sources, which make it possible to

¹ To avoid cumbrousness, I uniformly translate *grundsatz* by *Principle*.

produce cognition of objects in general, is not only itself possible, but even necessary, for otherwise such assertions must run the risk of being considered mere assumptions.

Furthermore, we here confine ourselves to the Principles which refer to the Categories. We therefore exclude the Principles of the transcendental Aesthetic, that space and time are the conditions of the possibility of phenomena, and of phenomena only. For the same reason, mathematical Principles are not part of this system. Yet still their necessity, since they are synthetical and *a priori*, must find place in it, not to prove their accuracy or necessity, but merely to explain and justify (*deduce*) the possibility of such pure cognitions. We shall first discuss the Principle of analytical judgments, in order to free the synthetical, with which they are contrasted, from misapprehension, and illustrate their real nature.

Of the highest Principle of all Analytical Judgments.—The highest, though but negative, condition of all our judgments, quite irrespective of their objects, is that they shall not contradict themselves. It is negative, because judgments may conform to it, and yet be either false, as combining concepts otherwise than the objects direct, or baseless, as having no foundation either *a priori* or *posteriori*. This proposition, then : *no thing can have a predicate which contradicts it*, is the Law of Contradiction, is

an universal but negative criterion of all truth, and is merely logical, referring to cognitions as such, apart from their content. We may, however, make a positive use of it, not merely to avoid error, but to know truth. In *analytical judgments* whether affirmative or negative, the truth can always be adequately known according to this principle. For that which is already thought in the concept of an object, must be rightly affirmed of that object, and its contradictory denied, else the object would contradict our concept of it. The law is, therefore, the universal and adequate principle of all *analytical knowledge*, but here its use as a sufficient criterion ends. It is, of course, a *sine qua non* of all judgments, but cannot determine their truth generally. And as we are concerned only with the synthetic part of our knowledge, we must, of course, beware of violating it, but cannot expect from it any light as to the truth of this kind of knowledge.

But there is a formula for this celebrated, though purely formal law, which does contain a synthesis, unnecessarily imported into it through inadvertence. Here it is: It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be *at the same time*. Here apodictic certainty, which is implied of course, is superfluously added by the word *impossible*, and what is more important, the proposition is affected by the condition of time. It affirms a thing A, which is something = B, cannot at the same time

be not-B; but it can be both B and not-B successively. For example: a man who is young, cannot at the same time be old, but becomes so in the lapse of years. It is quite wrong to make the purely logical law of contradiction depend on time-relations, and such a course obscures its real import. The mistake arises from first separating the predicate of a thing from our concept of it, and then connecting its contradictory with that predicate. This produces no contradiction with the subject, but only with the former predicate, which we had connected synthetically with the subject, and even then only when the two predicates are posited simultaneously. If I say a man who is unlearned, is not learned, I must add, *at the same time*, or it may be false. But if I say, no unlearned man is learned, the proposition is analytical, and is evident without the addition of *at the same time*. For this reason, then, Kant alters the formula, in order to express clearly the analytical nature of the law.

§ 2. *Of the highest Principle of all Synthetical Judgments.*—To determine the possibility of synthetical judgments is, as we have seen, the duty not of general but of transcendental Logic, and is indeed its most important function, for thus alone can the compass and limits of the pure understanding be determined. As, in synthetical judgments, I must pass out of the concept (*subject*) to consider something quite different in relation with it—this is never

a relation of identity or contradiction, and so in the judgment, *per se*, we cannot see either truth or error.

Granted, then, that we must pass out of a given concept, to compare something else synthetically with it, some third thing, or medium, is necessary, to contain the synthesis of two concepts. What is this medium? There is but one envelope (*Inbegriff*) which embraces all our representations, viz.—the internal sense, and its form, Time. The synthesis of these our representations depends on the Imagination, their synthetical unity on the unity of apperception. Here, then, we must seek the possibility of synthetical judgments,—nay more, of synthetical *a priori* judgments, which will be shown necessary from these sources, if a cognition of representations can be accomplished, resting exclusively on the synthesis of representations.

If a cognition is to have objective reality, that is, to refer to an object, and have in it significance, the object must of course be somehow given. To have an object given immediately, by representing it in intuition, means nothing but to refer its representation to experience, either actual or possible. Even space and time, pure and certainly *a priori* as they are, would have no objective validity, and no meaning, were not their necessary use exhibited in objects of experience; nay, our very representation of them is a mere schema, ever referring to the

reproductive imagination for matter to fill it, without which they would bear no signification. So it is with every one of our concepts.

The possibility of experience, then, or of being experienced, is what gives all our *a priori* cognitions objective validity. Experience again is based on a synthetical unity—a synthesis of phenomenal objects according to the Categories, or principles of its form, which lie *a priori* at the basis of experience. These are indeed universal rules of the unity of phenomena, but their objective reality, nay even their possibility, can only be shown in experience. This is the medium in which synthetical *a priori* propositions can exhibit their objective reality.

We do, indeed, in the case of space, and of the figures which the productive imagination draws in it, discover a great deal *a priori* by way of synthetical judgments, and really without requiring any experience; but this occupation would be mere hallucination, were not space considered as the condition of phenomena, which are the materials of external experience. Hence, even the pure synthetical judgments of Mathematic refer to possible experience, or rather to its very possibility, and on this alone is based the objective validity of their synthesis.

‘As, therefore, experience as an empirical synthesis is, in its possibility, the only sort of cognition

which gives to all other syntheses reality, so experience as an *a priori* synthesis can only have truth, or agreement with its object, by containing nothing more than what is necessary for the synthetical unity of experience generally. Here, then, is the highest Principle of all synthetical judgments: every object comes under the necessary conditions of the synthetical unity of diverse intuitions in a possible experience.' Thus *the possibility of* (the general faculty of) *experience*, and *the possibility of* (there being) *objects of experience*, lie under the same conditions, and thus our synthetical *a priori* judgments about the former obtain (through the latter) objective reality.¹

§ 3. *Systematic Exposition of all the synthetical Principles of the pure Understanding.*—We must ascribe it purely to the understanding that there exists such a thing as principles. For the pure understanding is not only a faculty of rules, but the very source of Principles, according to which every possible object stands necessarily under rules, which add to phenomena the cognition of an object corresponding to them. Even laws of nature, regarded as principles of our ordinary experiences, carry with them the expression of necessity, or at

¹ The reader should compare the corresponding discussion in the *Prolegomena* (III. pp. 63, *sqq.*), entitled, *How is a pure Science of Nature (Physic) possible?*

least the suggestion of being determined by grounds valid for all experiences. But such laws again stand under the higher Principles of the understanding, which they merely apply to particular cases. There is no danger of confusing these two classes of Principles, for the absence of that necessity according to concepts, which the latter have, is easily perceived in the former, however universally valid.¹ But there are pure *a priori* Principles, which are not properly to be attributed to the pure understanding, because they are drawn (not from pure concepts, but) from pure intuitions, by means of the understanding; such are those of Mathematic. Still, their objective reality in experience, and the deduction of their possibility, must rest on the pure understanding.

Hence, says Kant, I shall not enumerate among my Principles those of Mathematic, but only such as Mathematic requires for an *a priori* basis of its possibility and objective validity. These are the principles on which Mathematical judgments are based, and proceed from *concepts* to intuitions, not *vice versâ* (as the ordinary Mathematical axioms do).

In applying the Categories to possible experience we may use them either *mathematically* or *dy-*

¹ He seems here to prefer the criterion of necessity to that of universality; cf. above, p. 37.

namically, for they may refer merely to the *intuition*, they may also refer to the *existence* of a phenomenon. The *a priori* conditions of intuition as regards possible experience are absolutely necessary; those of the existence of objects of a possible empirical intuition are, as such, only contingent. Hence the Principles of Mathematical use must be unconditionally necessary, and be apodictical in form; those of dynamical use, though also (of course) necessary *a priori*, are so mediately, under the condition of empirical thinking in some experience. The latter have not therefore such immediate evidence, though equally certain, as generally applied to experience.

The table of the Categories is of course our natural clue to the Principles, inasmuch as these are merely the rules of objectively applying them.

These Principles are therefore—

1.

Axioms of Intuition.

2.

Anticipations
of Perception.

3.

Analogies
of Experience.

4.

Postulates of

Empirical thinking in general.

These terms are carefully chosen, to indicate distinctions of evidence and use. It will soon appear that the determining of phenomena by the Categories of *Quantity* and *Quality* (regarding merely the Form

of the latter) differs from that of the others, one being intuitively, the other discursively certain. Hence they are distinguished as *Mathematical* and *Dynamical Principles*.¹ At the same time, they are not the Principles of Mathematic, nor of general Dynamic (Physic), but the Principles of the understanding in respect of our internal sense, upon which depends the possibility of both these more special classes of axioms. Kant's Principles are therefore so called on account of their application, not their content.

¹ Kant adds a note in the 2nd Ed. giving a sketch of the various classes of combination.—All combination (*conjunctio*) is either *composition* or *nexus*. The former is the synthesis of multiplicity not necessarily inseparable, as, for example, the two triangles formed by the diagonal of a square. This is the nature of all synthesis of *homogeneous* parts that can be *mathematically* estimated. It is *aggregation*, if extensive; *coalition*, if intensive. *Nexus* again is the synthesis of inseparable parts, such as accident and substance, effect and cause, which are *heterogeneous*, though combined *a priori*. This combination, as being arbitrary [*willkürlich*], he means that no reason can be assigned why these particular heterogeneous elements are combined], I call *dynamical*, because it concerns the combination of the *existence* of multiplicity, and this again is either *physical*, of phenomena among one another, or *metaphysical*, of phenomena in the cognitive faculty *a priori*. These four kinds of combination evidently answer to the four classes of Principles.

CHAPTER XII.

THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES.

(I.) AXIOMS OF INTUITION.— Their Principle is:
*All intuitions are extensive Quantities.*¹

PROOF.

All phenomena contain as to form an intuition in space and time, which is their *a priori* basis. They cannot therefore be empirically apprehended except by combining multiplicity, and so generating the representation of a definite space or time, the

¹ See what he says about the relation of this Principle to axioms proper in his more special discussion in the *Methodology, Critick*, p. 446, Ed. Bohn. I may here observe that Kant, with that habit of repetition and variation of statement common to the books of almost all great discoverers, has in his 2nd Edition inserted after the Definition of each of the first three classes of Principles an additional paragraph, entitled *Proof* or *Demonstration*. With one exception (that of *Community*) these inserted paragraphs merely repeat in varying language what follows them, and what had stood in the original edition. The reader who compares my Commentary with Kant's text will therefore find that I have curtailed the arguments considerably, but only by leaving out repetitions. I trust there is no distinct point, however small, omitted. The parallel discussion in the *Prolegomena*, §§ 24-32, will be found in Vol. III., pp. 81, *sqq.*

parts of which are homogeneous, and conceived as a synthetical unity. This is the notion of a quantity (*quantit.*) As therefore the perception of an object as phenomenon is only possible through this synthetical unity of multiplicity, all phenomena are *extensive quantities*, because they must be represented by the same synthesis which determines space and time generally as quantities.

Kant defines an extensive quantity as that in which the notion of the part precedes and renders possible the notion of the whole. So I cannot conceive a line without drawing it in thought, and thus generating successively all the parts which make up the whole intuition. It is so also with every time, even the shortest. As every phenomenon must be intuited through space and time, it must also be an aggregate, or combination of given parts, and this is only the case with those quantities which we apprehend as *extensive*.

‘On the successive synthesis of the productive imagination in generating figures is based Geometry and its axioms, which express the *a priori* conditions of intuition under which alone the schema of a pure concept of an external intuition can exist; *e.g.*, between two points only one right line is possible; two right lines cannot enclose a space. These axioms properly concern only *quanta* as such.’

But as to determining the *quantitas* of a thing,

and answering the question, how large is it?—though there are various synthetical and indemonstrable propositions about it, yet they cannot be called axioms. For that equals added to equals make equals is an analytical proposition, whereas axioms must be synthetical. On the other hand, the self-evident propositions about particular numbers are synthetical, but not universal, like geometrical axioms. They should therefore be called numerical formulae. $7 + 5 = 12$, as has been already seen (above, p. 47), is synthetical.¹ But it is also singular. For this synthesis of unities can only be made in one way, though the use of the numbers is afterwards universal. The construction of a triangle, as a pure function of the productive imagination, may be produced in a thousand ways, but 7 and 12 only in one way. Were such propositions, then, axioms, they would be infinite in number.

This transcendental Principle of the Mathematic of phenomena extends our *a priori* cognition widely. For now we see why pure Mathematic in all its precision is applicable to objects of experience. Empirical intuition is only possible through pure intuition. What Geometry says of the latter must

¹ Kant (and Mansel) seem to have overlooked such numerical axioms as $a(b + c) = ab + ac$, and $ab = ba$, which are both synthetical and general.

therefore be true of the former. All evasions of the laws of construction of space (such as the endless divisibility of lines and angles) must vanish. For these theories, which deny the objective validity of space and of the Mathematic based on it, are only the devices of a misguided reason, which endeavours to free the objects of the senses from the formal conditions of our sensibility, in which case nothing whatever could be asserted of them *a priori*, and Geometry itself would become impossible.

(2.) ANTICIPATIONS OF PERCEPTION.—Their principle is : *In all phenomena the Real, which is an object of sensation, has intensive quantity, or degree.*¹

¹ This Principle was worded in a slightly different way in the 1st Ed. 'The Principle, which anticipates all perceptions as such, is thus expressed: In all phenomena sensation and the *real*, which corresponds to it in the object (*realitas phenomenon*) has a degree, or *intensive quantity*.' It will be seen that the form of the 1st Edition is more realistic here than that of the 2nd. At the same time, we should be most cautious not to suppose that the *real, which corresponds to sensation*, is a thing *per se*. It will appear from Kant's discussion on the first *Analogy* that we are obliged to conceive a phenomenal substratum, distinct from each particular representation, and this we call the substance, or the *real* in nature, as it is permanent, and neither increases nor decays. The fuller explanation must be postponed to its proper place. It was probably this obscurity of anticipation which caused Kant to alter the form in the 2nd Edition.

PROOF.

Perception is empirical consciousness, in which there is sensation. Phenomenal objects of perception are more than mere formal intuitions (of space and time). They contain in addition the materials for some object, represented as existing in space and time. This is the real (element) of sensation, and accordingly a mere subjective representation, which makes us conscious of being affected, and which we refer to an object in general. Now from this empirical consciousness down to pure consciousness a gradual change is possible till we reach a mere formal intuition of space and time. So we may also regard sensation as a gradual production, beginning with 0, in pure intuition, and rising to a certain quantity. Thus, while it is not an objective representation containing space and time, it still has an *intensive quantity*, or a degree of influence on our sensibility, which must accordingly be attributed to all objects of perception.

All cognition, which determines empirical cognition *a priori*, may be called *πρόληψις*, and this was doubtless Epicurus' meaning for the term. But sensation, or the matter of perception, is the very thing which distinguishes the empirical as such from *a priori* knowledge; this therefore should be the element never anticipated. Pure determinations of space and time alone can do this. But supposing we can find an universal feature in sen-

sation as such, apart from particular sensations, this might with exceptional propriety be called anticipation, as out-running experience in the very province which we owe to it alone. This is here really the case.

Apprehension, if regarded not as a succession of sensations, but as one, fills an instant only; if it be absent, then the empty instant = 0. But on the other hand, the instant of time when filled with sensation is regarded not as an extensive quantity that can be dissected, but as an unit = 1.¹

Intensive Quantity may then be defined: that which is apprehended as unity, and in which multiplicity can only be represented by approximating to 0. Kant observes parenthetically that when this reality of phenomena is regarded as a *cause*, e.g., of sensation or of change, the degree of reality as cause is called *moment*, as in the 'Moment of Weight,' because its apprehension is momentary—a very curious criticism.

Every sensation, then, and every reality in phenomena have a degree, which can be diminished, and between reality and negation there is always a series of possible realities and possible lesser perceptions. Every colour, every temperature, has a degree, which, however small, is not the least possible.

¹ Vol. III., p. 86, *note*.

This attribute of quantities, that no part of them is the least possible, or simple, is called their *continuity*. So there is no part of space or time which is not itself space or time. Points and instants are only boundaries or limitations, which themselves presuppose the intuitions which they limit. Of such boundaries, then, as elements, time and space could never be composed. As generated by the productive imagination in the equable lapse of time, they may also be regarded as equably *flowing* quanta.

If this synthesis be interrupted, we have an aggregate of many phenomena, produced by the repetition of an ever finishing synthesis. If I call twenty shillings a sum of money, I may rightly consider this as a continuous quantity, no part of which is the least possible, but might be a coin, containing under it further subdivisions. But if I speak of twenty shillings as so many *coins*, it were improper to call them a quantum of shillings; they are an aggregate, or number. But in this number each unit is a quantum, and as such a continuum.

All quantities, whether extensive or intensive quanta, being continuous, we could here easily demonstrate with mathematical precision the proposition, that all change is continuous, did not the causality of change lie quite beyond the reach of transcendental philosophy, and presuppose empirical principles. The understanding gives us

no light *a priori* how a cause should be possible, which alters one condition of a thing into another, and besides in this particular case only a certain number of the features of phenomena are affected, which experience alone can show us, while their cause is to be found in the unchangeable. As we are here using nothing but pure *a priori* fundamental concepts, we must postpone such inquiries.

But we are in no want of evidence how important our Principle is, in anticipating perceptions, and in precluding false impressions drawn from their deficiency. It is obvious that if all reality in perception must have a definite degree, separated from negation by an infinite gradation of lesser degrees, that no perception or experience can possibly prove a total absence of reality in phenomena. In other words, we can never from experience demonstrate empty space or empty time. For such a thing can never be perceived, nor can it be inferred from, or brought to explain, the differences in degree of reality in any phenomenon. For though the whole intuition should be real in every part, yet there are infinite degrees between this and negation of reality in such intuition, regarded as an intensive quantity, though the extension may remain the same.

Here is an example. Almost all physicists, perceiving a great difference of weight in the same volume or extension of different bodies, have inferred that this volume contained vacuities, but in

various measure. Who could have thought that these chiefly mathematical and mechanical inquirers would have based their conclusions on a metaphysical hypothesis—a thing which they so studiously avoid? They assumed that the *real* in nature was *homogeneous in every case*, and only variable in the number of its parts, or extensively. To this purely metaphysical assumption Kant opposes a transcendental proof, which does not indeed pretend to explain the differences in the filling of space, but destroys the notion that it can be explained by assuming empty spaces, and leaves the mind free to adopt some other explanation. We now see that though equal spaces be perfectly filled with matter, this matter has in quality a degree (say of resistance or of weight) which may be infinitely various. Thus the heat of a room may diminish infinitely without leaving a single particle of its space empty, by filling them still completely, but with a lesser degree of its quality. ‘I am not asserting this, says Kant, as a fact, but as a probability which overthrows a very prevalent false assumption.’

Nevertheless, this Anticipation of Perception does seem strange to an inquirer trained to transcendental reflection, and so rendered cautious. How is it that the understanding can presume an *a priori* principle of distinction in sensation, abstracting from its empirical quality? For here we are declaring synthetically *a priori* concerning that

which is purely and specifically empirical. This is the answer. The particular *quality* is always empirical, and in no sense *a priori*. But the Real, which corresponds to sensation generally, as opposed to negation or voidness, is nothing but a notion of existence, and is a mere synthesis (of quantity and of quality) in empirical sensations generally. For without changing the quantity, and abstracting from it completely, we can conceive a full sensation as affecting us equally with an aggregate of lesser sensations conveyed to us separately, each in its own moment; so we can anticipate *a priori* that quality must have intensive *quantity*, just as we determined *a priori* that all quantity must have a *quality*, viz., continuity.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE DYNAMICAL PRINCIPLES.

(3.) ANALOGIES OF EXPERIENCE.—Their Principle is : *Experience is only possible by representing a necessary combination of perceptions.*¹

PROOF.

Experience is an empirical cognition, or one which determines an object by perceptions; and this of course by a synthesis of perceptions. This synthesis is not in the perceptions, but consists in their variety being combined in one consciousness; this is the essential feature in cognising *objects* of sense. But as perceptions occur in accidental or contingent order in time, we cannot conceive any necessity in their combination derived from this

¹ The first Edition has this principle in a different form, and brings into prominence the element of time. 'All phenomena as to their existence come *a priori* under rules of their mutual determination in a [portion of] time.' It is a mistake of Kuno Fischer to assert (*Comm.* p. 107) that Kant in the 2nd Edition omitted the all important element of time in his analogies. He does the reverse, for instead of merely stating it, he adds a new paragraph under the title *proof*, in which he *argues* it out.

source. Since, then, experience is a cognition of objects not as they are accidentally represented in time, but as they are in time objectively, and this pure time itself cannot be perceived, the *a priori* combination which determines objects can only be that of the categories and schemata which connect them *a priori*. These carry with them necessity, and so a necessary combination of perceptions becomes essential to experience.

The three modes of time are—*Permanence*, *succession*, and *simultaneity*; from hence come our three rules. They are in fact phases of the one great form of all our empirical consciousness, viz., the necessary *unity* of apperception in all time, whereby all perceptions must be *mine*, and so bound together in one great chain. This apperception affects and orders the internal sense, of which it is the form. Thus all empirical time-determinations must come under rules of universal and *a priori* time-determination, and these latter are the rules now under consideration.

These Principles have the peculiarity that they concern, not phenomena and the synthesis which we make in intuiting them empirically, but only their existence and their mutual *relation* as regards this existence. This was stated above in our first sketch of the Principles, as we saw that the way in which any phenomenon must be apprehended, can be so determined *a priori*, as to give us a rule applicable

to every particular case. But the existence of any phenomenon cannot be known *a priori*, or known determinately, so as to distinguish it from others, even if we could infer *a priori* some existence or other.

For this reason Kant called the former two Principles mathematical, as showing that phenomena are only possible, in intuition as well as in perception, by reason of a mathematical synthesis. Even in the second case we construct the sun's light, for example, which means our degree of sensation, by combining 200,000 moonlights. These principles may therefore be called *Constitutive* (of phenomena). The others must be called in contrast *Regulative* (of the existence of phenomena). We cannot dream of having axioms and anticipations here. But although, when one perception is given to us in a time-relation with other (though undetermined) perceptions, we cannot say *a priori what other* and *how much* perception must be conjoined with it, we can still declare how they are necessarily combined in this mode, or particular description, of time. Philosophical are very different from mathematical analogies. These latter assert such an equality of *quantitative* ratios that if the first three members be given, we can construct the last (as in the ordinary 'Rule of Three'). A Philosophical analogy is an equation not of quantitative but of *qualitative* ratios, where the first three terms give

us, not the fourth term itself, but the *relation* to a fourth term—in fact only a rule for seeking it in experience, and an attribute by which to recognise it there. An analogy of experience is then a rule which gives us unity of experiences in various phenomena, and is accordingly a Principle merely *regulative* of phenomena. The same remark holds good of the Postulates of empirical thinking generally, which regard the form, the matter, and the relation of perception to our empirical thinking generally. All these regulative Principles differ from the constitutive, not in certainty, but in the nature of their evidence.

It is of great importance to observe here that all these synthetical principles have their meaning and validity not in the transcendental, but in the empirical use of the understanding; we must hence subsume the phenomena not directly under the Categories, but under their schemata, which are the exemplifications of the Categories in Time. These schemata are merely (cf. above, p. 258) sensuously restricted syntheses of the functions of the pure Categories. The pure Category has no such restriction. Hence we can only combine phenomena by means of these Principles according to an *analogy* with the logical and universal unity of the Categories. While therefore we use the pure Category in the statement of the Principle, we must employ in the application of the Principle the schematized

Category, which is its restricted formula, and which will give us the key to its use.

A. FIRST ANALOGY.

Principle of the Permanence of Substance.

In all succession of phenomena substance remains permanent, and its Quantum in nature neither increases nor diminishes. This statement varies slightly from that of the first Edition, which asserts that all phenomena contain the permanent (*substance*) as the object itself, and the changeable as its mere determination, or way in which the object exists.

PROOF.

Phenomena are in time, in which alone, as the unchangeable substratum, or permanent form of internal intuition, *simultaneity* and *sequence* are represented. But time *per se* cannot be apprehended. We must therefore find in the objects of perception the substratum which represents time, and by relation to which we apprehend change or simultaneity. If this were not so, the very notion of the unity of time and its consequences just stated were impossible. But if we turn to phenomena, that which is the substratum of all that is real is known as *substance*. Hence the permanent element, by which all time-relations of phenomena can alone be determined, is the substance in the phenomena, or the real element, which always remains the same, as the substratum of modifications.

As this (*ex hypothesi*) can never alternate, its quantum can never be increased or diminished in nature.

This proof requires fuller development, being at first sight both obscure and inconclusive. Kant accordingly adds: our *apprehension* of multiplicity is ever successive and changing. We can therefore never know whether as objects of experience its parts are simultaneous or successive, if it have not something *permanent* and *constant* as its basis. Change and simultaneity are only so many modes of the existence of this permanent. In it alone, therefore, are time-relations (*viz.*, the two just mentioned) possible, and thus the *permanent* is the *substratum* of our empirical representation of time itself, and expresses this time as the constant correlatum of all existence and change in phenomena. For alternation affects not time itself, but phenomena in time. By comparison with the permanent, and thus alone, does existence in various parts of the ever-fleeting equable time-series become a *quantum*, which we call *duration*. Consequently, as time itself cannot be apprehended, this permanent in phenomena is the substratum of all time-determinations, hence of the synthesis of phenomena, hence the condition of the possibility of experience itself. In all phenomena the permanent is the object itself, the phenomenal substance; all that alters is but a determination of this substance.

Philosophers have at all times agreed with the vulgar in assuming this distinction, but expressed themselves a little more precisely, and have said: in all changes the *substance* remains, and the *accidents* only alter. But, says Kant, I can find nowhere any trace of proof for this very synthetical proposition; it is also seldom placed, as it ought to be, at the head of the pure *a priori* laws of nature. To say that *substance* is permanent, is a mere tautology. For this permanence is the sole ground for our applying the Category of substance to phenomena. It should rather have been proved that there *was* something permanent in all phenomena. As this synthetical *a priori* proposition could never be demonstrated dogmatically, from mere concepts, and as no one ever considered that such propositions are limited to the sphere of possible experience, and so provable only by its possibility being shown to depend on them—under these circumstances, it was of course assumed, as being a necessary want, but never proved.

The philosopher who determined the weight of smoke by subtracting that of the ashes from that of the wood burnt, postulated that even by fire substance or matter cannot be destroyed, but only changed in its form. Similarly the proposition *ex nihilo nihil fit*, is but a consequence of the Principle of Permanence, or of the constant presence of the subject proper in phenomena. Being the

substratum of all time-determination, it must have done so in all past time, as well as now and henceforth. We can therefore only call a phenomenon substance because we postulate its existence in all time, a thing inadequately expressed by *permanence*, except that future duration is inseparably bound up with the necessity of permanence *a parte ante*. Thus the ancients never separated these statements :

‘Gigni

De nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti,’

which we do, because we falsely apply them to things *per se*, and suppose they might deny the dependence of the world on an ultimate cause. But they do apply strictly to phenomena, and to them alone, as the unity of these in experience would be impossible if new substances originated. We have no other way of representing the unity of time than by the identity of the substratum, which unites with its bond all alteration. This permanence is accordingly nothing more than the way we have of representing to ourselves the existence of things (in phenomenon).

* I call particular attention to this argument on the nature of the substratum of phenomenal objects, as of the last importance when we come to consider Kant's *Refutation of Idealism*. It contains the really fundamental contrast between his system

and that of Berkeley; nay, it constitutes, perhaps, the most peculiar feature of the whole *Critick*. All other idealists, or preachers of the Relativity of knowledge, had assumed that the substratum of phenomenal objects was identical with the things *per se*. Berkeley in particular denied any such substratum, on the grounds that being heterogeneous from phenomena, it could never be perceived by any human faculty. Now Kant used this very argument against our knowledge of things *per se*, yet here he supports and explains our notion of substance, as phenomenal, though a substratum, and separate from each of our representations. It is the abolishing of this substratum, because he confounded it with things *per se*, which brings Berkeley under Kant's censure of making our external experience mere illusion—a censure which has hitherto puzzled commentators, and made them charge Kant with injustice to his predecessor. But we must carefully separate in Kant's system three things—(1) representations; (2) the substance or substratum in which they inhere as phenomena, which must be in space and time, and is therefore itself phenomenal; (3) a hidden thing *per se*, which by its action, likewise occult, produces in us both the changing representations and the notion of their substratum in space, but is totally unlike either, and may be one or many, the same for internal

and for external phenomena, or diverse—this we can never tell.¹ It will at once be seen that Kant's originality lies in the position given to the second element. Its permanence need not be a perception, but a representation that we always can have perceptions, because we are always in time, and we can only know this by having perception in time. It is then a representation of the permanent, not a permanent representation (cf. note to second Preface, p. xli, Bohn, *sub fin.*), which forms the phenomenal substratum of the qualities of bodies. In my former exposition of this passage, appended to Kuno Fischer's Commentary, I had failed to put forward this all important doctrine clearly. I trust there will no longer be any doubt or difficulty as to Kant's meaning.

The particular ways in which a substance exists are called its *accidents*, which are always real, as affecting the *existence* of the substance, negations

¹ In direct proof of this subdivision of substrata, cf. Vol. iii., p. 223, where, in discussing the relation of Phaenomena and Noumena (1st Ed.), he says: '*But as to the reason why we, not satisfied with the substratum of sensibility, have added noumena to the phenomena,*' &c. Perhaps I should not have spoken of these latter (noumena) as substratum, an expression which Kant uses in the phenomenal sense, but it will serve to put my meaning more clearly, with this remark as to Kant's use here added, for the sake of accuracy. He shows in the sequel (p. 225) how loosely we must understand the word noumenon, if applied to things *per se*.

are merely assertions of their absence. If we choose to assert a separate existence for any of these real accidents, as, for example, for motion, as an accident of matter, it is called inherence, as opposed to the subsistence of the substance. As many mistakes may thus arise, it is better and more accurate to speak of accidents as above, and call them the ways in which the existence of substance is positively determined. But as it is impossible to avoid separating them logically from substance, and contrasting them with it, the Category of substance is placed under the head of Relation; rather as containing the conditions of such, than as being itself a relation.

From the same point of view we can now clear up the notion of *change*, which is not the origination or extinction of the object changed, but a mode of its existence, following upon another. The object is *constant*, and its condition only alters. The paradox therefore is true: that only the permanent, (or substance) is changed, the transient suffers no change, but *alteration*, or substitution of one determination for another. It follows that changes only can be perceived in substances, never absolute origination or extinction. For if we would pass from not-being to being, there must be a time when the object which originates is not yet. As empty time is no object of perception, we could only perceive it by placing in it things which last up to the

moment when the new thing originates. If so it would only be a determination of these things regarded as permanents. The same difficulties meet us if we try to conceive extinction. There is only *one time*, in which all different times are placed not as co-existent, but as successive, and accordingly permanence is a necessary condition, under which alone we can determine phenomena, as things or objects, in possible experience. The empirical criterion of this substantiality will be discussed in connexion with the next analogy.

* It appears to me that Kant should have here stated as a legitimate inference of the Principle, that we regard substance in general as one, and of the same kind. Being the substratum which represents to us the single time in which all our experience takes place, and not being identical with its manifestations, which constantly vary, we regard this sum of real substance in the world as one, identical and indestructible. We shall see that as to the criterion of its presence he agrees with Hamilton in making resistance and its modes the proper proof of permanence. But we must first understand clearly his notions as regards *action*, before this feature in his system can be clearly explained.

B. SECOND ANALOGY.

Principle of succession in time according to the law of Causality.

All changes come under the law of Cause and Effect.¹

PROOF.

All apprehension of multiplicity is with us successive, but whether the parts are successive in the object, as well as in our apprehension, is another question. We may doubtless call every conscious representation an *object*, but what this word means, apart from mere representation, requires deeper investigation. As mere representations they can in no wise be distinguished from our apprehension of them, and are always successive. Were these objects things *per se*, no one could possibly guess from their representations in us how matters stood in the objects themselves, for we can only know them by our successive representations. It remains for me to determine what combination in time belongs to the manifold of intuition apart from

¹ The original form was: Everything which happens (begins to be) presupposes something, which it follows *according to a rule*. With his usual love of repetition, Kant added in the 2nd Edition two paragraphs entitled *Proof*, which merely repeat what follows after in the original edition. I therefore omit commenting on them. The same remark holds good of almost all the paragraphs inserted in the 2nd Edition immediately after the statements of the Principles.

our apprehension, which is always successive. For example, I apprehend the parts of a house successively, and yet no one will admit that these parts are really so. Yet remember that this house is no thing *per se*, but a phenomenon. What, then, is understood by the question: how is multiplicity connected in the phenomena, which are in themselves nothing? For here the sum of our representations is contrasted with our separate representations, and we desire to investigate their agreement. It is evident that on Kantian principles we are concerned here with nothing but the formal conditions of empirical truth, or of correspondence between cognition and its object, and phenomena can only be considered separate from the acts of our apprehension, if they come under some necessary rule (imposed, of course, by the understanding), which distinguishes them from our apprehension, and makes a peculiar sort of combination necessary. That in the phenomena, which contains the condition of this necessary combination, is the object.

As we cannot empirically perceive creation or extinction, any apprehension of an event is a perception following another (positive) perception. But though all our perceptions are successive, in some we perceive that the sequence cannot be reversed. When, for example, I see a boat carried down a river, I cannot reverse the order, and apprehend the boat at first below, and then above in the

parts of the river observed. In apprehending a house on the contrary, I can begin with any part indifferently. Here there is no rule. But in the other case, which is an *event* that happens, there is *necessary* order, and therefore a rule.

In this case, then, the *subjective sequence* of apprehension must be deduced from the *objective sequence*, which gives a necessary *rule* to the arbitrary order of the former. Thus I can distinguish phenomena from my apprehension of them, and say that it is determined by them. The rule implies that in the antecedents of every event are to be found the conditions upon which the event necessarily follows, but the rule will not allow me to reverse the order, and determine the antecedents from the event, for the lapse of time cannot be reversed, and this is a necessary condition of the rule. Were there no such antecedents, and no such rule, then all the sequences of our perception would be merely subjective, and we should possess a mere play of representations referring to no object, as the order might be reversed at pleasure. We should then not have two *states* of the object in succession, but one apprehension following another subjectively, without determining any object for us. It is only by making my subjective apprehension objective by means of the rule that I can ever have experience of an *event*.

This view opposes the old empirical derivation

of causes from the observation of uniform consequences, in fact from what Mr. Mill calls the Method of Agreement. Were this the real derivation of the notion it would of course lose, with its *a priori* character, its objective universality and necessity. But the case is quite similar to that of space and time, as regards which we only draw clear notions from experience, because we have ourselves put them into experience, and even made experience possible by doing so. We shall not deny that experience is of use in giving us clear examples of the rule, but the existence of the rule as a condition of the synthetical unity of phenomena in time is nevertheless the *a priori* basis of this very experience.

We are therefore called upon to show by an example that even in experience we never attribute the sequence to the object, nor separate it from our subjective apprehension, except for a rule compelling us to adopt one peculiar order of perceptions: nay more, that this compulsion is what makes succession in the object possible. Seeing that all our representations are equally internal modifications given to us in the lapse of time, how is it that we add to them an object, in other words that over and above their subjective reality, as modifications of mind, we give them an objective reality? It cannot be a mere reference of some representations to some other, for then the same

question must still arise as regards that other. What, then, is this new dignity, this *reference to an object*, which we give our representation? On investigation it will be found to affect them in no other way than combining them necessarily in a particular way, and so subjecting them to a rule; it is only by means of this rule that they on the other hand obtain an objective signification. As all my apprehension is successive, it is only when I assume a necessary reference to an antecedent state that I assert an event, or that something has happened; that is to say, I cognise an object, which I put into a definite place in time, a place fixed by the foregoing circumstances. To say, then, that something happens, implies an antecedent, which defines the time. But this time must be fixed by a rule, which cannot be reversed, and moreover the antecedent must be necessarily followed by the event in question. Hence arises an order among our representations, in that the present points to an antecedent state, which, though an undetermined correlate, refers to its consequent as determining it, and necessarily connected with it in the series of time. If it be a *formal condition* of our perceptions that the prior moment of time determines the posterior, it is of course a necessary *law of the empirical representation* of time that phenomena, by *which alone we can know empirically this continuity in time*, should be similarly determined.

No experience is possible without the understanding, and its first duty is to render objects not distinct, as former philosophers have said, but *possible*. This is done by transferring to phenomena and their existence the order of time, and assigning to them a fixed place in it. This place is fixed not by the relation of phenomena to absolute time, as it cannot be apprehended *per se*, but to one another. An event, then, is a perception belonging to possible experience, which becomes real by my regarding the phenomenon to be determined in place as to time, and so by my regarding it as an object, which I can always find by a rule in the connexion of my perceptions. The rule is, that there are antecedent conditions, upon which the event necessarily follows. Consequently, says Kant, the Principle of Sufficient Reason is [in this sense, viz.], as to succession in time, the basis of possible experience.

After again recapitulating, for about the tenth time, the momenta of his proof, Kant approaches a new difficulty. We have hitherto confined the law of Causality to successions, whereas, in fact, it applies to simultaneous phenomena. A room is warmed by a fire now present in it. Here, then, is cause and effect, but no succession in time. The greater part of the efficient causes in nature are of this kind, and their effects are only *consequences*, because the cause does not produce its whole effect in an instant. But in the moment, when the effect

first originates, it must be (as it were, in contact, and) simultaneous with the causality of its cause, for had this causality ceased for an instant, the effect could not have arisen. It is not, then, the *lapse*, but the *order* of time which is of importance ; the interval may be *evanescent*, but still the time-relation remains. If I place a bullet on a soft cushion, it produces a cavity, which is simultaneous with the bullet. But I nevertheless distinguish them by the time-relation of their dynamical connexion. The cavity follows upon my laying the bullet down ; the bullet will not follow upon the cavity, supposing it otherwise produced.

This Causality leads us to the notion of action, action to that of force, and so we reach that of substance. Kant declines to turn aside in his discussion of synthetical *a priori* cognition for the sake of expounding mere analyses, but here makes an exception as regards *the empirical criterion of substance*, so far as it appears to manifest itself better and more easily by action than by the permanence of the phenomenon. Where action is, that is efficiency and force, there must we seek for substance, the seat of a fruitful source of phenomena. But if we proceed to explain what we mean by substance, it is hard to avoid reasoning in a circle. How can we directly infer from an action the *permanence* of that which acts, and yet this is the essential and peculiar attribute of phenomenal sub-

stance? The problem cannot be solved by the ordinary analytical method, but presents to Kant no peculiar difficulty. Action implies the relation of the subject of the Causality to its effect.¹ Now, as all effects consist in events, which are changeable and successive, the ultimate subject of the changeable is the *permanent*, as being the substratum of all that changes, and this is substance. For according to the Principle of Causality actions are always the first cause of all alterations of phenomena, and cannot therefore be in a subject which itself alters, as this alteration must then be determined by other actions, and another subject. Action is accordingly a sufficient criterion of substantiality, without my requiring to seek out permanence by a comparison of perceptions, in which way we could hardly obtain the strict universality required in the notion of substance. That the first subject of the causality of all origination and disappearance cannot itself originate and disappear in the field of phenomena, is a certain inference, and coincides with the notion of substance in phenomena.²

¹ This is Kant's consistent definition of action, which shows that he distinguishes between the cause and its causality in a manner foreign to Hamilton and Mansel.

² The result of this argument is that the permanent is the simultaneous condition, not the cause, as Kuno Fischer seems to understand it (*Comm.* p. 119), for Kant expressly states (*Critick*, p. 259), that substance and accident do not stand in the relation of a regressive series. But the question remains,

When something happens, the mere happening, apart from the particular thing that happens, the passage from the non-existence of a state to its existence, is worth investigating. Affecting not substance, but its states, it is only a change, not an origination from nothing. If this origination is regarded as proceeding from a foreign cause, we call it creation, which cannot be admitted in phenomena, as its very possibility would destroy the unity of experience. What may happen if I regard things *per se* is not here under discussion. But how a thing can change its state in time, we have not the least notion *a priori*. We require real forces empirically given to us. But the *form* of every change,

What effects suggest to us action, as distinguished from mere causality? This question Kant has answered in pp. 169, 379 of the *Critick*, where he distinctly suggests *impenetrability*. He is still more explicit in p. 193 (when discussing Leibnitz' system: 'Substance in space we only cognise through forces operative in it [the term *force* is with him equivalent to action] either drawing others towards itself (attraction) or preventing others from entering into itself (repulsion and impenetrability); we know of no other properties that make up the notion of substance phenomenal in space, and which we term matter.' In other words, while we attribute other qualities of a substance to causes acting upon it from without itself, we consider impenetrability (Locke's *solidity*) as the action of the substance itself upon us. This is the plain, common sense belief. The reader will see that Hamilton might have found both his division of the qualities of bodies into three classes, and the importance of resistance and its modes, in Kant's system.

as opposed to the matter, this can be determined by the law of Causality and the conditions of time *a priori*. Observe, says Kant in a note, that I am not speaking of the change of relations generally, as when a body moves uniformly, but of a change of state, as when it changes the quantity of its motion.

We now approach another inference. When a substance changes its state, the new state *b*, even when only differing in quantity from the first *a*, is related to it as to 0 or non-existence, for even in this case *b* — *a*, which did not before exist, has come into being. How does a thing pass from this *a* to *b*? Between any two moments there is time, and between any two states a distinction, which has a quantity (by our first Principle). Every change, then, takes place in the time-interval between the moment which determines the former and the moment which determines the latter condition. But every change has a cause showing its causality through the whole time in which the effect is being originated. It follows that all changes are produced not suddenly, but gradually, and through lesser degrees continuously up to the full result. The action of Causality, so far as it is homogeneous, Kant calls a moment. The change does not consist in these moments, but is generated by them as their effect. This is the *law of Continuity of all changes* depending on the fact that neither

time nor anything appearing in time can be a *minimum*. No distinction of state can be the smallest possible, and so there are infinite gradations from 0 to any given state *a*.

The uses of this Principle in the science of nature do not concern us; but how such a Principle, however right and obvious, can be possible *a priori*, this is worthy of note, as there are so many pretended extensions of our knowledge by pure reason, without proper *deduction*, in our critical sense.

It is simply this. Every increase in our empirical knowledge is nothing but an additional determination of our internal sense, a progress in the determination of time, whatever the objects may be. Accordingly, every transition in perception to some succeeding perception is a gradual generation of the latter in time, which is always a quantity, through degrees, which are consequently never absolute *minima*. Thus, then, we can assert a law *a priori* concerning changes as regards their form. The understanding, by means of the unity of its apperception, enables us to determine all the places in this time continuously, through the series of causes and effects, which impose a necessary order and sequence.

C. THIRD ANALOGY.

Principle of Co-existence, after the law of mutual action in community.

All substances, so far as they can be perceived as being

*together in space, are in systematic (durchgängiger) mutual action, or community.*¹

PROOF.

Things are said to be simultaneous empirically when their perceptions can follow mutually, as for example, I may perceive the earth and then the moon, or *vice versa* ; or I can consider the various parts of a house in any order I please. This means that they co-exist in the same time. But I cannot perceive time itself, and take these perceptions out of it, and all perception is successive, so, then, without some further clue, I should merely infer that the one is there, when the other is not, and *vice versa*, but not that the objects were simultaneous, that where one is the other must be also, in order that the perceptions may succeed each other mutually. We require, then, a concept of the understanding to declare this simultaneity to be objective. But the relation of substances, one of which contains determinations based upon the other, is the relation of *influence*, and if this be reciprocal, it is the relation of Community, or reciprocal action. The simultaneity of substances in experience cannot be cognised, except under this supposition, which is accordingly a condition of the possibility of things as objects of experience.

* It will be noted that Kant carefully avoids

¹ The first edition is not at all so cautiously worded: 'All substances, so far as they are together, stand in systematic community (mutual action.)'

stating this law as one of reciprocal *causation*—an error into which Kuno Fischer and other commentators have fallen. The statement of the Principle in the second edition confines Community to relations of space, and I think rightly. For there it is strictly true that if our experience is to have any unity or connexion, the places of all objects are mutually determined by each other. I determine the place of a table, a room, a house, a town, by its relation to other simultaneous objects—nay more, the very earth itself by its position in the Solar System. These objects do not stand in the relation of reciprocal cause and effect, but in that of mutual influence, or community, as Kant has above strictly and accurately defined. The exposition of the first edition, which follows that inserted in the second under the head of *proof*, is not so accurate, though of greater length, and contains a statement which has led to this misunderstanding. ‘That only can determine the position of anything in time which is the cause of it, and [or?] of its determinations. Therefore must every substance (for it can only be a consequence as regards its determinations) contain within itself the causality of certain determinations in another, and at the same time the effects of the causality of this other—in other words, they must be in dynamical community, or reciprocal action.’ It is not correct to speak of the place occupied in space by a substance as part of its causality, and

yet this is the principal 'ground of determination' which it possesses as regards other substances. I hold, then, that Kant, when inserting his new paragraph, should have modified his old proof. But to resume.

The word community may mean either *communio* or *commercium*. We use it in the latter sense, as that without which the former could never have been ascertained. We can see in experience that but for mutual relations, but for a continuity of perceptions, influencing each other (at least as regards place) in space, we could never proceed from one perception to another. There may be such a thing as empty space if you like, but its occurrence in the field of phenomena would break up and destroy the unity and system of our experience. This *commercium*, then, controls our ever successive apprehensions, and compels us to place those substances which are subject to it, not as successive, but as simultaneous, and objectively so. Thus phenomena are brought together into a *compositum reale*, or system of simultaneously existing objects.

The three dynamical relations, which are the sources of all others, are therefore Inherence, Consequence, and Composition.

By Nature, in the empirical sense, we understand the connexion of phenomena in their existence, according to fixed rules. There are therefore certain laws or rules, which are *a priori* conditions of

nature; on those the empirical rules must depend. Our analogies express the unity of nature in this connexion of phenomena under certain exponents, which express nothing but the relation of time (as comprising all existence) to the unity of apperception. They declare as their whole result : that all phenomena must be comprised within a *single* Nature, since without their *a priori* unity, no unity of experience or determination of objects in it would be possible.

Kant's method of proof in establishing these transcendental laws of nature is declared by him a model according to which all such demonstrations must proceed. He contrasts it with the dogmatic method, by mere analysis of concepts. By this method such synthetical Principles could never be attained, for where is the medium, the *x* (cf. above, p. 45) in which we are to seek the evidence of such synthesis? It is in the possibility of experience, as a system or complex of cognitions, or acts of knowing, under which all the objects of cognition must come. Here we found rules of synthetical unity *a priori*, and so anticipated nature. It was for want of this clue that so many abortive attempts have been made to prove the Principle of Sufficient Reason. The other Analogies, though often assumed, were never even stated, which could never have been the case had they known the infallible

clue, the Categories. Thus the unity of the world, he adds in a note, is a mere inference from our 3rd Analogy, and were not the mutual influence of objects a necessary condition of their very existence, the unity of their connexion could not be inferred from it.

CHAPTER XIV.

(4.) THE POSTULATES OF EMPIRICAL THINKING GENERALLY.

1. What agrees with the formal conditions of experience (intuition and concepts) is *possible*.
2. What is connected with the material conditions of experience is *actual*.
3. What has its connexion determined according to universal conditions of experience is (exists) *necessary*.

§ 1. *Exposition.* The Categories of Modality have this peculiarity that as predicates they do not increase the attributes of the subject, but only alter its relation to our knowing faculty. Let the concept of a thing be ever so perfect, I may still inquire whether it is possible or actual, or if so, whether it be necessary, and each of these mean, what relation has it to our faculties of experience?¹ These Principles of Modality are then nothing but expositions of the

¹ Hence it is that Kant afterwards calls propositions of existence *subjectively* synthetical, as adding no objective predicate, and hence it is, probably, that older philosophers sought to discover existence analytically in the notion of God. Locke, how-

notions of possibility, actuality, and necessity in their empirical use, and also restrictions of all Categories to mere empirical use. For if these Categories are to be anything more than mere analytical expressions of the form of thinking, and are to apply to *things*, they must be applied to possible experience, in which alone these things can be given us.

§ 2. *The Postulate of Possibility.* The objective form of experience in general contains all the syntheses necessary for cognising objects. A concept implying a synthesis is void, and applies to no object, except the synthesis is borrowed from experience (as in *empirical concepts*), or is an *a priori* condition of experience (as in *pure concepts*), which still belongs to experience, as its object must be there found. It is, of course, a necessary logical condition that the concept shall contain no contradiction, but this is far from proving the objective reality of the object denoted by it. For example, a bilinear figure is not self-contradictory ; its impossibility depends on the conditions of space, in which we must construct it ; these conditions have objective reality, because they contain in them the general form of experience.

ever, saw the distinction, unconsciously perhaps, but nevertheless clearly, and accordingly separates judgments of existence into a fourth class, distinct from both analytical and *objectively* synthetical judgments.

The Postulate is therefore of great importance. Supposing I represent to myself the pure Categories of Substance, of Causality, of Community, how can I infer from these arbitrary syntheses themselves that they are to be found in the field of experience? I can only discover their objective reality and transcendental truth by perceiving that they express *a priori* the relations of all our perceptions, and they are thus independent indeed of experience, but not of the form of experience and its synthetical unity.

But if we endeavour to construct new notions of substances, forces, and community from the matter of our perception, without finding in experience itself examples of such connexions (syntheses), we are adopting mere hallucinations, with no evidence of their possibility. Such imaginary notions cannot be deduced from the *a priori* conditions of experience, but must have their possibility shown *a posteriori*, or not at all. A substance permanently present in space, without filling it, like the *tertium quid* of philosophers, a peculiar power of intuiting the future, without inferring it, or a power of being in a community of thought with other men, however distant from us—these are concepts whose possibility has no basis, as not being founded on the known laws of experience. They are not self-contradictory, but have no claim to objective reality, or the possibility of such an object as we here imagine.

Here Kant is not concerned with possibilities derived from experience, but with those through *a priori* concepts, and such cannot be obtained from mere concepts, but from the objective conditions of experience generally.

It might be thought that the possibility of a triangle could be inferred from our concept of it, which is quite independent of experience, and to which we can give an object by a pure *a priori* construction. But this is after all only the form of an object, and would remain a creature of the imagination, the possibility of which is doubtful, until we see that space is the formal condition of all external phenomena, and that the very same formative synthesis by which we construct the triangle *a priori* is exercised in apprehending a phenomenon and obtaining from it an empirical concept; then such an object becomes possible. The same can be shown in any other case, such as that of continuous quantity, &c.

§ 3. *The Postulate of Actuality*¹ requires *perception* or conscious sensation, either of the object itself, or of its connexion with some actual perception, according to the analogies of experience. In the *mere concept* of a thing not a single mark of its existence

¹ The term is *Wirklichkeit*, which is usually translated by *reality*, a term nearly synonymous. But inasmuch as actuality implies *present* reality, or connexion with it, I think it approaches closely to his meaning.

can ever be discovered. However complete internally, all this has nothing to do with the question, is it given to us?—given in such manner that the perception might come to us before the concept. For perception is the matter of the concept, and alone gives it actuality. In one sense we can assert a thing to be actual *a priori*, when we infer it by the analogies from other actual perceptions, but these tell us that if we pursue the clue given us, or that if our senses were more acute, we should have actual perception of it. Such, for example, is the case of magnetic particles, which our senses are too coarse to perceive directly. But we must strictly follow the laws of the empirical connexion of phenomena.

* These rules for proving actual existence mediately are directly opposed to idealism in the ordinary sense, which asserts the actuality of mental phenomena, but will not concede it to anything else. Kant accordingly turns aside here to give (in the second edition) his celebrated and much decried *Refutation of Idealism*. As the clear understanding of this argument will require a comparison of other passages, and also some polemical discussion, I shall postpone it to a separate chapter, and shall here follow the remainder of the exposition as regards the Postulates of Modality.

§ 4. The *Postulate of Necessity* of course regards material necessity in existence, not logical necessity

in the combination of concepts. But as actuality can be inferred only comparatively *a priori* by the connexion of perceptions, so this necessity must be inferred, as necessarily implied by it, and as there is no existence necessarily given on condition of others, except the causes of given effects, it is not the existence of substances, but of their states, which we can know to be necessary, and this in consequence of other states which imply them as their causes. Hence the criterion of necessity is simply the law of possible experience, that every event is determined *a priori* by its cause in phenomena. So we cognise the necessity of *effects* in nature, of which the causes are given us, and the law reaches no further, not even to the existence of things as substances, for we cannot perceive them as *empirical effects*. The law, therefore, that every event is hypothetically necessary is a rule of necessary existence, without which we can have no nature. In other words, *in mundo non datur casus* is an *a priori* law of nature, and this necessity being hypothetical is rational. So is the other brocard, *non datur fatum*. These laws bind the myriad variety of changes into one *nature*, or synthetical unity imposed by the understanding. The first is properly a consequence of the Principle of Causality, the second of those of Modality. The continuity of time shown in the earlier Principles adds another, *in mundo non datur saltus*; that of space, a fourth, *non*

datur hiatus, as we saw that a vacuum was inadmissible. These Principles being of transcendental origin can be ranged according to the clue of the Categories, and Kant says any practised reader can do it for himself. I suppose he regards the world in Quantity as a Totality, or unity of multiplicity which excludes *hiatus*; in Quality as Continuous, and so excluding *saltus*; in Relation as a series of effects, excluding *casus*; in Modality, as necessarily determined by causes, and excluding *fatum*.

§ 5. Whether the field of possibility be greater than that of actuality, and this again than that of necessity—these are interesting questions, and purely within the jurisdiction of Reason. They mean to inquire, whether the whole complex of phenomena belong to one experience, and to it alone, or whether they may on the contrary belong to some other experience as well. Our Understanding lays down its rules subject to the conditions of *our* sensibility. Different forms of this sensibility, and different forms of the understanding, even were they possible, we cannot grasp or explain in any possible way, but could we do so, they would certainly not belong to that experience in which objects are given to us. The Understanding, therefore, has nothing to say to such questions. Apart from these considerations the proof usually urged in favour of a very extended field of possibility is palpably weak.

'All that is actual,' say they, 'is possible, and then by conversion *per accidens*, some possible is actual, which indicates that the actual does not exhaust *all* the possible. It seems, then, as if we added something to the possible to make it actual.' Such a view Kant disputes. Whatever, he says, could be added to the possible must be the impossible. What *is* added is not in the possible, but in my understanding, that is to say a connexion with some actual perception is added, and this does not restrict the field of the possible, but brings some part of it into a new relation towards me. All that is possible, then, can become actual, and there is no sphere of phenomena apart from our experience to be inferred from this shallow argument. Let it be remembered that what is possible only under conditions which are themselves possible, is in no sense absolutely possible, or possible in *every* respect (*in aller Absicht*). Yet this is the only sense in which we can employ the term possibility, when inquiring into the possibility of things beyond experience. These questions, as transcending experience, belong properly to the Reason, and will be considered more fully hereafter.

But in what sense are the Principles of Modality Postulates? Certainly not in the sense lately given it by philosophers, and opposed to that of the mathematicians from whom they borrowed it—I mean in the sense of assuming a proposition as im-

mediately certain, without proof or justification. Such a proceeding must ruin our whole Critick, in which for every synthetical judgment we demand either a proof, or at least, a deduction of its claims.

But as was already observed, these Principles are synthetical in a peculiar sense, not adding to the concepts of phenomena any attribute, but merely adding a particular relation to the mind, and hence *subjectively synthetical*. Thus a thing, without in the least changing its attributes, is considered by us as *possible, actual, or necessary*, according as it is connected with the formal conditions of experience, with perception, or with the connexion of perceptions by concepts. These Principles, then, express the action of the understanding, by which a certain concept is generated. Now this is precisely the mathematical notion of a postulate. We are told to describe a circle with a given line about a given point, and this requires no proof, because the very act postulated creates the notion of the figure which we want. In like manner our present Postulates direct the mind how to put together its concepts of things.

§ 6. Kant adds in the second edition a *General Remark on the System of the Principles*, which recapitulates the general result of the discussion. In the first place, it was shown that from the pure Categories we can never ascertain the possibility of a thing, but we must always have recourse to intui-

tion, whenever we desire to prove objective reality. Without doing so we have no *cognitions*, but merely *forms of thought*. For the same reason no synthetical proposition could ever be *constructed*, far less *proved* from mere Categories. Take, as an example of the latter, the proposition : Every contingent existence has a cause. We could never get beyond this point, that without such relation to a cause we cannot comprehend the existence of the contingent. But how does it follow that it is also a condition of things as well as of our thoughts? Our Principle of Causality was proved for things of experience, and for them alone ; it was valid of objects given in *empirical intuition*, and not proved from mere concepts. It is indeed true that the proposition, Everything contingent has a cause, is plain enough from mere concepts, but only by so constructing the concept of contingency as to contain not the Category of Modality (something, of which we think the non-existence), but that of Relation (something, which can only exist as the effect of something else). It is then an identical proposition to say, what can only exist as an effect, must have a cause. So it is that all examples of contingent existence are taken from *changes*, and not from the possibility of *conceiving the reverse* ; because a change depends upon its cause as a condition, and this may not exist, hence it is an identical proposition to say, that a contingent thing must have a cause.

On the other hand, the ancients, who could very well conceive the non-existence of matter, did not therefore make its existence contingent. Even the successive being and not-being of any given state of a thing does not prove the contingency of this state, except it be shown that *at the same moment* in which it was in one state it might have been in the opposite. *Ex. gr.*, to show the motion of a body to be contingent, we must prove that it could at the same moment have been at rest.

It is still more remarkable, that in order to show the possibility of *things* in accordance with the Categories, and so show the *objective reality* of the latter, we require *external* intuitions. To show something permanent in intuition corresponding to the Category of *Substance* we require an intuition of matter in space, as time is always fleeting. So as to *Causality* we must take change in space or motion, to explain to us the combination of contradictory states in the existence of one and the same thing. For the same reason, we can only represent time by a *line*, and internal succession by the drawing of a line, as the internal sense gives no permanent intuition, whereby to perceive changes. So as to *Community* : we cannot understand it or illustrate it except by the relation of substances in space, as before explained. Thus Leibnitz, when he gave to substances, as thought by the understanding, a

community, was compelled to bring in the Deity to produce it, as being in itself inconceivable.

The importance of this remark will be felt in the *refutation of Idealism*, which we shall now discuss, and it is also of the last importance in refuting the false notions as to our knowledge of self, which we shall meet in rational psychology.

* CHAPTER XV.

KANT'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS IDEALISM.

§ 1. THERE is no part of the Kantian philosophy clearer or more precise than his careful distinction of his own position as a mere critical idealist from that of Des Cartes the sceptical, and Berkeley the dogmatical idealists. There is no more masterly discussion in all the Critick than his refutation of the fourth paralogism of rational psychology, as it stands in the First Edition,¹ and yet, owing to this fuller statement being greatly curtailed, and also transposed, in the later editions, its importance has been overlooked, and its import strangely falsified. Even now, the German Kantians are in the dark on the subject, and the last edition of Kuno Fischer's Commentary, published in 1869, repeats its former blunder, which I had corrected in my translation of the book.

The passage which misled the Germans was the well-known *Refutation of* (material or problematical) *Idealism* (p. 167, Ed. Bohn), not introduced

¹ Cf. Vol. III., pp. 242, *sqq.*

into this edition as a novelty, but transferred to a new place from its old place among the Paralogisms. Internal experience was preferred to external by Des Cartes, and was called certain as opposed to the uncertainty of the knowledge gained from external sense. In the first edition, Kant, refuting this (supposed) superior certainty of internal experience, showed it to be merely phenomenal, and therefore of the same kind as external experience. This is the gist of his long discussion on the 4th Paralogism *of the ideality of external relations*. In the second edition, Kant, supporting the original dignity and importance of external experience, showed it to be not only equal to internal experience in certainty, but logically prior to it, in that it is presupposed by internal experience. This discussion naturally comes into the *Analytic*, being an important question in the Metaphysic of phenomena. Hence it becomes necessary to transfer the argument from its original place in the *Dialectic* to this earlier position. But the identity of the two discussions is perfectly obvious to anybody who will study them, though it has been ignored by all previous commentators. This oversight was, I think, the main cause of their subsequent errors. Regarding the new form as a new argument, believing Schopenhauer's audacious assertion about the retracted idealism of the first edition, they imagined that Kant had inserted this passage to prove the existence of

things *per se* in space, an absurdity so monstrous, in Kant's system, that it must indeed be, as they said, the sign of a broken-down intellect. The absurdity, however, is not in Kant, but in his critics. A short comparison of the two passages, and an exposition of their true import, will show that they are consistent, logical, and strictly necessary to Kant's system.

§ 2. There are other passages, in which he officially approaches the question, and in a polemical attitude. In his *Prolegomena* (III., pp. 56-62), as well as in an appendix to his *Prolegomena*, where he replies to the strictures of Garve in the *Göttingen Gelehrte Anzeigen*, he gives a short and precise sketch of his attitude as regards Berkeley and other idealists; and as the latter passage is not accessible in English, I shall quote the relevant part of it *verbatim* in the course of this exposition. The discussion is so full and clear in its earliest form, that I need do little more than point out the slight modifications in form with the identity of matter, in the corresponding places.

But there is one more passage, of capital importance, in which Kant repeats his assertion of critical idealism. It is the sixth section of the *Antinomy of the Reason* in the *Critick*, and is entitled *Key to the Solution of the Cosmological Dialectic*. In this discussion, which *maintained its form unaltered in the two editions*, the reader will find a precise and official

re-assertion of the views contained in the fourth *Paralogism* of the first edition, and it was probably this very recurrence which made him curtail that discussion. I know of no other passages in Kant's works which bear directly on the question. We have then these six: (1) the discussion of the *fourth Paralogism* in the first edition; (2) the substance of this argument transferred from the *Dialectic* to the *Analytic*, and entitled *Refutation of Idealism*, in the second edition; (3) a note appended to the preface of the second edition, in which he expands and explains this *Refutation*; (4) the sixth section of the *Antinomy of pure Reason*, in both editions; (5) his polemical statement under the heading *Remarks 2 and 3*, at the conclusion of the section, 'How is pure Mathematic possible,' in the *Prolegomena* (Vol. III., pp. 54-62); (6) Kant's statement of his doctrine in reply to Garve, published at the end of his *Prolegomena*, between the appearance of the first and the second editions of the *Critick*.

'Let us then see,' says Kant, in this last passage, 'what sort of idealism it is which runs through my whole work, though it be far from constituting the soul of the system. The attitude of all genuine idealists, from the Eleatic school to Bishop Berkeley, is contained in this formula: all cognition through sense and experience is nothing but mere illusion, and only in the Ideas of the pure understanding and Reason is there truth. The fundamental principle,

on the contrary, which thoroughly rules and determines my idealism in this: all cognition of things from mere pure understanding or pure Reason is nothing but illusion, and only in experience is truth. As this is the exact opposite of that proper idealism [which I have just described], how did I come to use the term for an opposite purpose? The solution can easily be found from the context of the book. Space and time, with all they contain, are not the things, or their properties *per se*, but merely belong to their phenomena; so far I am in agreement with these idealists. But they, and among them especially Berkeley, considered space a mere empirical representation, known to us, with all its determinations, like the phenomena in it, only by means of experience or perception. I show on the contrary that space (and time, which Berkeley overlooked) with all their determinations are known *a priori*, as the pure form of our sensibility. Hence it follows that as truth depends upon universal and necessary laws as its criteria, experience cannot have for Berkeley any criteria of truth, for he put nothing *a priori* at the basis of its phenomena. It follows farther that experience is nothing but illusion; whereas in my system space and time, combined with the Categories, prescribe their laws *a priori* to all experience, and this affords a sure criterion for distinguishing truth from illusion in experience.'

‘Idealism proper, he adds in a note, cannot but have a visionary object, whereas mine is merely intended to explain the possibility of our knowing objects of experience *a priori*, a problem never yet proposed, far less solved. By it we remove all this visionary idealism, which, as we can see even from Plato, inferred from our *a priori* cognitions, even of Geometry, some other intellectual intuition than that of the senses, because it was never suspected that the senses could intuit *a priori*.

‘My so-called (critical) idealism is accordingly quite peculiar, both in upsetting the ordinary idealism, and by giving to all *a priori* cognitions, even those of Geometry, their objective reality, which, without my proving the ideality of space and time, could not be asserted by the most zealous realist. I wish I could change the title of my doctrine, but as this seems hardly possible, I may be allowed in future, in order to avoid misrepresentation, to call it formal, or better, critical idealism, as distinguished from the dogmatical of Berkeley and the sceptical of Des Cartes.’¹

§ 3. I do not think any comment of mine can make either this statement or the other passage in the *Prolegomena* clearer, nor do I think I need do much more than call the reader's attention to the excellent *resumé* in the *Antinomy of the Pure Reason*

¹ Cf. the analogous note in the *Critick*, p. 307.

(*Critick*, pp. 307, *sqq.*), where he repeats that this idealism of his, which he calls indifferently *formal*, *critical*, and *transcendental*, is not only totally distinct from *material*, *problematical*, and *sceptical* idealism, as he calls that of Des Cartes, but even subversive of it. He shows that the objects given in external intuition are indeed only phenomena, but as such fully as real and certain as those of internal intuition, and that these latter in no sense give us anything more than phenomena in the sensibility of a self unknown apart from them. Internal phenomena, because in *time*, are as far from being things *per se*, as external phenomena are, because they are in *space*. Reality and actuality, apart from our present perceptions, mean that in the progress of experiences we should come upon the object, or it means nothing at all.¹

Why, then, should Kant ever mention things *per se*?—why should we speak as if such things were in any sense existent? Because, though to us such things *per se*, as opposed to things of experience, must for ever remain completely unknown, there is yet a feature in our experience which necessarily suggests them. Our sensibility is a *receptivity*, as opposed to the *spontaneity* of thinking. We can only conceive this receptivity as being affected by some foreign cause, and therefore ‘we

¹ Here is a strictly Berkeleian statement.

may call this intelligible cause of phenomena generally the transcendental object (or thing *per se*), in order to have something to correspond to our receptivity.' ¹ But, of course, this is no object in the only positive sense in which we can use the term. It is not in space, not in time, not under a category—not in fact definitely conceivable. It may be the same for all phenomena, or different; it may be of the same kind with the substratum of our thoughts, called the Ego, or it may not. All this we can never know; in fact, we are so completely ignorant of its conditions that we cannot possibly deny its existence, any more than affirm it. So, then, while as to the possibility of *our* KNOWING *things per se*, Kant is a strong and thorough (critical) idealist, as to the possibility of the EXISTENCE of *things per se*, he is a problematical Realist, especially guarding himself against the folly of denying it—a thing, he says (*Proleg.*, p. 61), 'which it never came into my head even to doubt.'

This subject naturally came before him in the *Paralogisms of Rational Psychology*, of which, per-

¹ 'Consequently, I grant by all means that there are bodies without us, that is things, which though quite unknown to us as to what they are in themselves, we yet know by the representations which their influence on our sensibility procures us, and which we call bodies, a term signifying the appearance of the thing which is unknown to us, but not therefore less real.'—*Proleg.* (Vol. III., p. 54.)

haps, the most salient, and even now widely extended, is that of the certainty of internal experience, and the doubtfulness of the information given us by external sense (ideality of external relations, III., pp. 242, *sqq.*). ‘*Cogito, ergo sum,*’ said Des Cartes, ‘is alone certain, all else is doubtful, being a mere inference from affections of self, of which the causes may be various, and are therefore necessarily doubtful.’ This is problematical or sceptical idealism, which Kant calls empirical idealism, because it denies the reality of our experience, which he strongly asserts. These empirical idealists, however, strangely enough, when they go beyond experience, are found to be transcendental Realists, as they hold that the external objects of our senses, though not accurately known by us, are, nevertheless, really existent in space and time, apart from our perceptions. Kant, on the other hand, owing to his doctrine of the necessity, of the subjectivity (and *therefore* of the objectivity), and of the mutual independence, of space and time, is an empirical Realist, asserting our experience to be as real as anything can possibly be to us ; he is an Empirical Dualist, asserting phenomena in space to be essentially different from those in time, *both immediately perceived*, and both equally real ; he is also a Transcendental Idealist, asserting that (whatever may be the case concerning unknown things *per se*) the things of experience can have no existence beyond it, and are

in no sense transcendently real. And yet it is in this sense that ordinary idealists have been asserting the reality of the things which we imperfectly know. He repeats again and again, in this his first edition, that he does not deny an unknown cause *without us, in the transcendental sense*, as a thing *per se*, but he insists that this is not the point at issue, which is rather the nature of things *empirically without us*, which he declares to be *immediately perceived and really known phenomena*, while the sceptical idealists think them *mediately perceived and doubtfully known things per se*.

§ 4. But hitherto we have confined ourselves to Kant's criticism of Des Cartes, what does he say about Berkeley? Apart from the sceptical idealist, says he, there is the *dogmatist*, who affirms the objects suggested by external sense to be non-existent, and that the reality of our external experience is an illusion. This theory proceeds, says Kant,¹ from finding in the notion of matter insoluble contradictions. These again proceed from the false theory of regarding space an attribute of things, and not a form of sensibility. This kind of idealism will be disposed of, says he in his first edition (III., p. 251), by my discussion of the *Antinomies* of the Reason by-and-bye ; it has already been dis-

¹ Vol. III., p. 251, cf. *ibid.*, p. 61, and *Critick*, pp. 41 and 167.

posed of, says he in his second edition (p. 166, Ed. Bohn), by my transcendental *Aesthetic*. How are we to justify this view of Berkeley's philosophy, and to explain this refutation of Berkeley's doctrine?

After considering with all possible care the works of Berkeley, viewed from the aspect suggested by Kant's criticism, I am of opinion that Kant has not clearly stated the source of Berkeley's idealism, and also the exact difference between Berkeley's system and his own. Berkeley is explicit in telling us that although his system does answer many objections and difficulties raised by men of science, by sceptics, and by atheists, that, nevertheless, his case rests upon the *a priori* impossibility of conceiving matter or substance apart from its attributes. It is in the imperceptible substratum (which he identified with the thing *per se*), and not in the attributes derived from space and time, that he finds his difficulty. He expressly makes extension, in the perception of space, subjective, and within the mind; he never once, so far as I can find, makes space and time essential attributes of substance, while holding its other qualities to be within us and subjective;¹ and lastly, there is no

¹ Nay, his very argument, asserting for primary qualities that subjectivity which had already been proved for second qualities, is an almost verbal anticipation of one of Kant's argu-

assertion which he has repudiated in all his philosophical discussions with more warmth than the imputation that his theory was one of illusion as to external bodies. On this point he speaks in the very same tone which Kant did (above, page 332, and *Proleg*, pp. 56-7), in answer to the very same charge. Perhaps the most ornate passage in all his works¹ is devoted to showing what he considers its absurdity. The very fact, then, of Kant making this charge repeatedly against Berkeley, while he was suffering under it himself, proves to my mind that he had done what is perpetually being done with philosophers, and with none more than with Kant himself—he had taken some second-hand account of Berkeleianism for Berkeley's own views, and this he applies himself to refute.² It is just like the celebrated critique which Cousin wrote on Locke, in which he refuted, not that philosopher, but his

ments. Cf. Berkeley's *Principles*, §§ 14-5, and Kant's *Proleg*, p. 55 (Vol. III.)

¹ Second Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous, near its commencement, Vol. I., pp. 158-60 (Ed. 1820).

² It was quite competent for Kant to argue that although Berkeley repudiated the charge of holding our external perceptions to be illusions, he was nevertheless justly liable to that charge. This is what many of Kant's opponents have said as regards Kant's repudiation. There is no doubt that according to Berkeley our internal intuitions justly and necessarily suggest to us the presence of mental substance, whereas he will not allow a similar inference in the case of external intuitions,

natural daughter, the French sensual school. The vulgar Berkeleians certainly did and do regard objects in space as an illusion, and when they give reasons are apt to cite those very difficulties about the infinity of finite things, and so forth, which Berkeley has discussed towards the close of his *Principles*, and which Kant explains in his *Antinomies*. But the doctrine of Berkeley himself was far nearer to Kant's doctrine than Kant imagined—in fact, it requires a careful weighing of the two systems to discover the deeper differences. There are, however, three capital points of contrast, which it may be well to set forth here in a few words.

In the first place, Berkeley, while asserting clearly and positively the subjective nature of space and time, while asserting that our perceptions of extension, as well as of succession, could be only *in the mind*, and nowhere else, yet did not explain or

which nevertheless suggest material substance with equal cogency. So far, then, Berkeley, whether he will concede it or not, is guilty of preaching illusion in two directions, first in overrating the evidence for an immaterial Ego given by internal phenomena; secondly, in underrating the evidence of external phenomena in comparison with it. Kant showed clearly that both stand exactly upon the same footing. But in charging Berkeley with preaching illusion, he was bound to notice Berkeley's repudiation of it, and show that such repudiation, however well meant, was not warranted. This omission, in such a man as Kant, seems to me to prove his imperfect acquaintance with Berkeley's own exposition.

appreciate the universality and necessity of these two forms of our intuition, and hence failed to assign them an origin in any wise different from that of secondary or contingent qualities of bodies. Here Kant's superiority is incontestable, as is fully explained by him in the passage above cited from the *Prolegomena*. Secondly, Berkeley, in his zealous polemic against the doctrine of an unknown and unperceived substratum, though in much of his argument, and even in his very words, he agrees literally with Kant's disproof of things *per se* in space and time, yet falls into the error of denying that our sensations may be the effect of an heterogeneous thing *per se* as their cause. He was probably bound by the old fallacy, which made men believe the cause to be necessarily *like its effect*, or homogeneous with it. Here, too, Kant is more cautious and more philosophical. He maintains a critical, not a dogmatical attitude. Thirdly, in disproving the substratum of qualities, Berkeley confused and identified the thing *per se* with the substratum of phenomena, and consequently failed to give a satisfactory account of *Permanence*, as the criterion ordinarily applied to phenomenal substances. He holds in fact that there is no such thing, except so far as the ideas we have perceived continue to exist in other minds. But these ideas, which render our perceptions permanent, by continuing them in other minds, must be either numerically identical with those we

have had or not so. If not so, the permanence is only an illusion produced by the occurrence of ideas exactly similar in other minds. If, on the contrary, it be held that the ideas preserved in other minds are numerically identical with ours, then their permanence is doubtless secured, but at the expense of their spirituality, and in contradiction to Berkeley's own repeated statement, that their *esse* is *percipi*; for that my bare perception should become another man's bare perception, and still maintain its numerical identity, is evidently inconceivable. His fanciful notion of the Deity, as the permanent receptacle of ideas, hardly requires serious consideration.

Here the contrast of Kant's views is really striking, and shows the immense advantages of a sounder theory on the origin of space and time. Holding these latter not to be empirically given, as Berkeley did, but necessarily to accompany all our sensations, Kant first showed that we can form no notion of Permanence *except in space*, thus getting rid of all speculations as to the permanence of unknown things *per se*. He next showed that Permanence was no illusion, but the necessary condition of change, and therefore an objective and necessary element of our experience. To what do we apply this notion of Permanence, and whence do we obtain it? From the fact that all our experience is comprised in one time, which time cannot be per-

ceived in itself, but only when occupied by some perception. Hence we infer the permanence of the matter of experience, of phenomenal substance, the changing states of which correspond to the various portions of changing time comprised in the one great complex of time. Thus we represent to ourselves the permanent, even though we have no permanent representation, and as an empirical criterion of this permanence in time, we use impenetrability, or modes of Resistance in space, for reasons already expounded (above, p. 307), and thus this feature in our experience, the belief in the permanence of phenomenal matter, and even in the invariability of its quantity at all time, is vindicated and explained.

This remarkable analysis was completely beyond the range of Berkeley's mental vision. But still Kant's assertion that he had overthrown Berkeley is only true as regards this special point. Here Kant is right in saying that Berkeley, considering things *per se* to be in space, denied them altogether, because of the absurdities which resulted. But he should have added that this remark applies to Berkeley's argument about the substratum of things in space, and not to their qualities. It is by distinguishing two substrata, one phenomenal, and the other a thing *per se*, that Kant answers this difficulty, positively in his *Aesthetic*, negatively in his *Antinomies*, where he solves the

apparent contradiction which results by means of his distinction. He has therefore rectified and modified the idealism of Berkeley, making it critical where it had been dogmatical, but embodying all the truth and the soberness of that celebrated system.

§ 5. We now return to the controversy between Kant and Des Cartes. This *sceptical* idealism, says Kant, which demands that our inferences from the data of sense shall be proved, is a thoroughly philosophical proceeding, and of great value in compelling men to sift the foundations even of their most ordinary experience. But the transcendental Aesthetic has already for us settled the whole question. Both space and time are within us, but are representations distinct in kind, and of equal authority. If internal phenomena suggest a mental substance in which they inhere, it must be a phenomenal substance, in time, and subject to the conditions of all phenomena. If external phenomena suggest a material substance in which *they* inhere, this matter must be in space, and phenomenal substance, and subject likewise to the universal conditions of phenomena. In neither case do these phenomenal substances give us the least clue to the nature of any thing *per se*, or supra-sensible and hidden cause of phenomena, itself existing out of space and time. Des Cartes, no doubt, thought that things *per se* might exist in space; he merely wanted proof that our intuitions are trustworthy

representations of this external reality *per se*. Kant shows that this is a completely false basis, that the only positive notion we have of reality is phenomenal, and that if hidden things *per se* are indeed the causes of phenomena, they are such absolutely heterogeneous causes that phenomena can give us no clue whatsoever to their nature.

These are the considerations adduced by Kant in his first edition against sceptical or problematical idealism. He enters upon them when discussing the supposed superior certainty alleged by all rational psychologists (and Des Cartes among them) in the case of internal experience. They all consider mind as given immediately and certainly, whereas matter is only given mediately, through what they call ideas, and therefore with inferior certainty. Kant shows (if I may be allowed to repeat this important point) that our external experience is as immediate, and therefore as certain, as our internal experience. He also shows that neither can give us any information concerning things *per se*.

But in his second edition, he advances to a still bolder position, as regards the dignity of external experience, and asserts not only its equality with internal experience, but in some respects its priority. Hence he transposes his refutation of idealism from the place where he denied the permanence and reality of self to be given, to the place where he asserts the actuality and reality of our external ex-

perience. It had been formerly an appendix to his refutation of the superior certainty claimed for our knowledge of the pure Ego; it now becomes an appendix to his demonstration of the equal certainty of our knowledge of all empirical phenomena.

The argument can be thus briefly summarised. We can prove against Des Cartes, that internal experience, which he thought so certain, is only possible by presupposing external experience, which he thought uncertain. But this proof will not be intelligible if we have not mastered Kant's discussion on the Principle of Permanence. It was there shown that we cannot possibly perceive change or indeed any *determination* in time, without having something permanent wherewith to contrast the changes. Now when I consider my own existence, I cannot but be conscious of it as *determined* in time.¹ If so, it must be determined

¹ Kant lays stress on the difference between a mere play of representations and an empirical experience which determines them in time. 'If it be objected to my proof,' says he, in substance (note to second preface, p. xl.) 'that it is only the representation of external things of which we are immediately conscious, and not [phenomenal] external things themselves, I answer that the very representations which you admit are determined in time, and therefore demand some permanent as the necessary condition of their determination. It is therefore impossible to escape my conclusion that internal experience presupposes external experience, whether you can understand the thing or not.' Let me put the matter into a simpler form.

by some permanent, in regard of which alone, the changes of any internal experience can be known as changes. 'This permanent can be no intuition within me, for there are no determinations of my existence within me but representations, and these are the very phenomena which await their determination from some permanent distinct from them.' But what permanent can there be distinct from our representations, and yet possible in intuition? Of course, the old theory suggested the permanent Ego, in contrast to its own passing manifestations. If we had an intellectual intuition, which could be applied to the pure Ego, it might doubtless serve this important purpose. But as we shall show more fully hereafter, this *I am* is no intuition, but a *logical condition* accompanying every act of the

Suppose you say to me that after all I cannot have anything before my mind except intuitions of external things, and these are, of course, within me, I answer, with Kant, that it is not true that your external experience is a mere set of mental modifications, for you have omitted this important additional element—that they are fixed or at least determined in time. Your existence can be marked out in years and days; your external experience does not come at random, but in fixed order, and in an order which you can only very partially determine for yourself. In many cases these your representations are forced upon you. What does all this mean? Simply that your fleeting existence is in relation to a permanent external something, which determines it in time, and without which all your representations would form no legitimate *experience*.

understanding, and only called permanent improperly, because it must accompany each of these acts. We must have the permanent of which we are in search homogeneous with the changes which it determines. If it be not in the same plane of knowledge, so to speak, it is for our purpose useless. Then again, a thing *per se* would be perfectly useless for the purpose, as it could not possibly be represented in space or in time, and therefore could not determine representations taking place in space and time.¹ What, then, can this permanent be? It can be nothing but that phenomenal substratum, or substance, expounded under the *Principle of Permanence*, which represents to us the whole of time, and so makes its determination possible. It is the way we have of representing to ourselves the existence of phenomenal things. It is, of course, no separate intuition, as there is none such perpetually accompanying us, but it is a possible intuition, and being at the same time a necessary Principle underlying experience, we use the empirical criterion of solidity (or impenetrability), when we wish to find it in our ordinary experience. This is what Kant means, when he says in his explanatory note that this representing to ourselves something permanent in existence is not

¹ Yet this is the absurdity with which Kant has been charged. In fact his argument has been absolutely reversed by his critics!

necessarily having any permanent representation. These latter are fleeting and various; the former is *an external thing, distinct from all my representations*—that is to say, the permanent substratum of phenomena, which occupies the whole of time, which never originates or decays, which can never be increased or diminished in nature.¹ This is the only suitable permanent, which can determine our internal sense in time, and hence our internal *experience* is only possible through external *experience*.

Before proceeding, let me turn all this abstruse argument into the language of common life. How do we practically determine the time and place of our own existence, the duration of our thoughts, the reality of our waking thoughts, as opposed to dreams and visions? Is it not by showing that they are simultaneous with external permanents, and therefore determined by them? Does the poet contrast the change and current of his thoughts

¹ Cf. *Critick*, p. xl. The reader will not have read this exposition without being struck with the analogy to Mill's *permanent possibilities of sensation*, which play so important a part in his latest philosophical work. The true basis of this substratum of sensibility was shown long ago in the works of Kant, to which Mill's argument bears in some respects a strong verbal resemblance. See especially his account of our passage from the permanent possibilities (or substratum of sensibility, as Kant would say) to a belief in existence distinct from them (or to things *per se*, as Kant would say), *Exam. of Hamilton*, p. 230 (3rd Edition).

with his permanent self, or with the permanence of external nature around him? Did not the most vulgar impersonation of common sense reply to Berkeley, by appealing to the 'empirical criterion of substance'—to solidity, in proof that our internal experience was necessarily combined with our equally certain external experiences? Lastly, when a man closes his eyes, and shuts out, as far as he can, external impressions, when he lets his fancy wander, or his thoughts apply themselves to abstract subjects, do we not then find that he rapidly loses the sense of determination in time; that he has no measure within himself, no comparison with any fixed standard, no Atlas upon whose fixed support his thoughts can perform their revolutions? Is not this again an empirical example of Kant's truth: that internal experience, that is, the regulated, legitimate connexion of internal phenomena, is only possible by presupposing external experience?

Of course, it is not asserted that all so-called external experience has this dignity. There is such a thing as fancy, and how its objects are to be distinguished from those of the external sense, is to be determined by the rules which distinguish experience generally (even internal experience) from fancy.¹ But the very distinction would be impos-

¹ Cf. Vol. III., p. 250, for this argument in the 1st Edition.

sible, if there were not such a thing as real external experience, nor could we ever have fancied the reality did it not exist. Our fancies are imitations of the receptivity of sense by the spontaneity of the imagination.¹ The position, therefore of the idealists is completely overthrown. If either of the two departments of our experience is more immediate or more important than the other, it is not internal but external experience. They are, however, as we have amply seen, both immediate, and both equally real and certain. I cannot see anything either inconsistent, or illogical, or unreasonable in this argument. It is the language of common sense translated into Kantian dress, and its basis in the understanding explained. Neither can there be the smallest doubt that this is the true meaning and purport of the passage in Kant's system.

§ 6. The reader who has followed me with any care through this Chapter will now be in a position to estimate the comments hitherto made upon Kant's *refutation of Idealism*. It has been persistently assumed, in spite of his explicit denial, that it was directed against Berkeley.² It has been persistently assumed, in spite of his explicit statement that it

¹ The question how a thinking subject can have external intuitions, he lays aside in both editions as insoluble. Cf. 2nd Preface, p. xli., note, *sub fin.*, and Vol. III., p. 263.

² Fischer, *Commentary*, p. 132.

affected external *experience*, that it was intended to prove the existence of things *per se* in space. Even the careful and laborious Ueberweg, who could not avoid seeing in Kant's text that he was directing himself against Des Cartes, invents a parallel reference to Berkeley, and labours to show, what no one disputed, that Kant's refutation of problematical idealism does not refute dogmatical idealism.¹ It must be allowed that Kant's want of direct reference to his first Analogy of Experience throughout the argument is likely to mislead the unwary reader, and when the philosophers came upon such expressions as, 'an external thing apart from our representation,' and, 'a representation of the permanent distinct from a permanent representation,' they, so to speak, met an ugly fence in a rough hunting country. Yet the discussion of the substratum in phenomena had occurred but lately, its empirical criterion had been discussed, and so they might

¹ Cf. his *Grundriss der Gesch. der Philosophie*, III., p. 195, note. Ueberweg is far the most accurate and trustworthy of the commentators I have met. If he had laid proper stress on Kant's explanation of the Permanence of phenomenal substance, he might have seen the proper bearing of the argument now under discussion. He has especially vindicated Kant against the charge of inconsistency in his various Editions, but has I think, only obscurely apprehended the whole of his case. Mr. Matthew Arnold's estimate of the Germans is as true in philosophy, as it is in philology; they are rather erudite and painstaking, than acute or clear in criticism.

fairly have been expected to recollect what they had read only a few pages before.

But the substratum of phenomena had been tacitly identified with the thing *per se* (which Kant had expelled from experience), even though a permanence of substance under changing attributes is a distinctly empirical notion,¹ and if not embodied in Kant's account of experience, would leave a fatal and disgraceful gap. The critics were never able to grasp, though it was written down plainly before them, that Kant could hold the 'inner possibility of matter' (Vol. III., p. 244) to be nothing but phenomenon; that he considered permanence a necessary condition in experience, though it be not itself given directly as an object of experience; that he used *substance*, and *substratum*, in a phenomenal sense;² lastly, that he properly used the word *thing* for the permanent substance given in space, as well as for the unknown transcendental cause of phenomena, always appending '*per se*' to the latter. But so accustomed were they to speaking of things *per se*, that they hastened to set down the 'thing apart from our representations' as a thing of this peculiar kind. It will hardly be expected of me to prove from the *Critick* Kant's perpetual use of the term *things* for objects of sense and experience.

¹ Cf. Vol. III., p. 256-7, a most important passage.

² Viz. *substantia phenomenon* repeatedly through his work.

The term occurs a hundred times.³ Nor do I expect that any one who lays stress on such a point will be likely to appreciate the weightier arguments already adduced. It is worth mentioning, lest it should be a stumbling-block to younger students, and for that reason alone.

Since the first publication of this vindication of Kant, in my Introduction to Fischer's Commentary, it has been adopted, or rather acquiesced in, by J. S. Mill and by Mr. Lewes, nor has any critic attempted to sustain the old mistakes, and perversions of the *Critick*, on this point. It is therefore not unreasonable to hope that this long-established and familiar blunder has at last been expelled from the History of Philosophy.

³ Cf. in the *Critick*, §§ 22 & 23 of the *Deduction* (p. 90, Bohn), also the conclusion of the *Postulates* (p. 176), the Distinction of Phenomena and Noumena, p. 182; the appendix on *concepts of Reflection*, p. 191; the 6th sect. of the *Antinomy*, p. 308; the *Prolegomena* (Vol. III.), pp. 54, sqq., &c. &c.

I should perhaps not have concluded this chapter without noticing that Kant himself, strongly and explicitly, in his second Preface, asserts the identity of the two editions in substance, and invites comparison of them, as expanding different parts of the same arguments, without differing either in propositions or in proofs (cf. *Critick*, pp. xxxix-xli), save only in the method of proof there added to the former edition.

CHAPTER XVI.

THIRD CHAPTER OF THE ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES.

§ 1. *On the Distinction of all Objects generally into Phenomena and Noumena.*

‘We have not only now travelled through the land of pure understanding, and carefully reviewed each part of it, but even surveyed it, and assigned to each thing its place in it. But the land is an island, and by nature itself shut in with unchangeable bounds. It is the land of truth (a charming name), surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the proper home of illusion, where many a bank of fog, and many a fast-melting iceberg lies to us of new lands, and by ever deceiving with false hopes the exploring mariner, involves him in adventures, which he can never either abandon or bring to a successful close. Before risking ourselves upon this ocean, in order to make certain whether it can afford us any hopes, it may be desirable to cast one more glance upon the chart of the country we are about to leave,’ and ask (*a*) whether we cannot rest content with this land in default of other domains ; (*b*) on what title we hold this country against all

opposing claims? A summary may be of use, even though a full answer to these inquiries has already been given in the course of the *Analytic*.

After so many repetitions, however, I shall spare the reader the additional recapitulation, and proceed to the passage in which he speaks of the Definitions of the Categories. The results indeed of the *Analytic* have hitherto been so sober and shabby, in confining all our knowledge to experience, that many might be disposed to question the utility of so long and dry a discussion. It may be urged in reply, says Kant, that no presumption is more offensive than that of demanding beforehand the results of an inquiry, when they would not even be intelligible, if at once stated.

§ 2. But yet there is an aspect which can be made clear to the most dull and discontented learner. It is this, that however well plain common sense may get through the world, without analysing the sources of its knowledge, upon one point it must be in the dark, and that is on the limits of its use, and on the spheres which lie within and without it respectively. This requires *Meta-physic* for its settlement, and without it the plain man may be wandering into blunder and illusion, which he cannot foresee or avoid. So then our conclusion is really of the last importance, when we showed that the Categories are only of empirical use. The case was similar with the notions of *mathematic*, and they will serve us as a good example.

These axioms about space and about magnitude are generated *a priori* in the mind, and yet require to be constructed in intuition, without which they have no *sense* or meaning. We draw the straight line between two visible points. We measure magnitude by number, and this we learn through sight by our counting-boards, or strokes used as units.¹

¹ It will be seen that he does not suggest Time as the basis of arithmetic here, though he does so presently. I adhere to my original view of Kant's theory, despite of Mr. H. Sidgwick's strictures in the *Academy* (No. 56), who repeats the old symmetrical view of Mansel and other critics, despite also of the able paper of Dr. Tarleton in the first number of *Hermathena*, in which he develops a positive theory of the growth of arithmetic from subdivisions of Time. This is I believe the only attempt yet made to meet the difficulty in a full and scientific manner. I am not disposed to deny the *possibility* of arithmetic being so obtained in the absence of *spatial* data, as for instance, in blindness or perpetual darkness; but I am as certain as ever that as a matter of fact, ordinary human beings do not learn it so, and that Kant felt this, and intended to derive our ordinary notions of number from this source, though he admitted the other. The apprehension of units may no doubt be successive, and so involve time, but I deny that in the early counting of small numbers, which the eye can take in simultaneously, this succession is a *conscious* element, and except it be explicitly present in consciousness, it has of course no claim to be regarded as the basis of arithmetic. I must add that Dr. Tarleton has supplied solutions to some of the difficulties I had raised, but surely his derivations are too subtle for ordinary use. In any case I am still in doubt whether similar representations repeated in time would have given the same notion of different units, which we derive from co-ordinated units in space. *The units in time may*

That the Categories and Principles are similarly circumstanced appears moreover from this, that we cannot give a real definition of any of them, that is to say, make the possibility of its object intelligible, without descending forthwith into the conditions of sensibility, where alone they can have meaning.¹ No one can describe magnitude except by saying that it is the determination of something by thinking how often an unit is repeated in it. But this *how often* is based upon succession, which implies time and the synthesis of homogenous units. So Reality, Permanence, and Cause are mere idle words except we take in Time, as has been amply shown in the discussion on the *Analogies*. So the Contingent can only be grasped by seeing the existence of something follow upon its nonexistence, or *vice versa*, in time. Possibility, Actuality, Necessity, these too can only be explained from the pure understanding by manifest tautologies. The logical

be the same thing reproduced: this cannot be the case with separate units in space.

¹ He develops the difficulty about defining the Categories in some passages, which I have given from his 1st Edition, in Vol. III. of this work, Appendix B, *a* and *b*. As an additional difficulty he tells us that the Categories can only be defined by judgments, whereas all such judgments imply and presuppose the Categories. It is the old difficulty of endeavouring to explain a necessary element of our knowledge by means of that knowledge which presupposes this element in fusion with other elements.

possibility of *concepts* is very different from the real possibility of *things*. Our Principles are accordingly nothing but Principles of the exposition of phenomena, and we must substitute for the proud title of an Ontology, which asserts a synthetical *a priori* knowledge of things generally, the more modest one of an *Analytic* of the pure understanding.

We may express this truth by saying that the pure Categories, deprived of the formal conditions of sensibility, have merely a transcendental *meaning*, but not a transcendental *use*. They are nothing but pure forms, indicating how the understanding must proceed in knowing any objects; but in no case can these pure forms of themselves give or suggest to us any objects.

§ 3. How is it, then, that the belief in *noumena* has arisen? And yet this belief is an old and well-established one in philosophy. I here prefer to follow the exposition of the first edition, which I have translated in the third volume, as it brings out more clearly the contrast between the phenomenal substratum and the thing *per se*, than his later exposition.

The ordinary objects of experience are called *phenomena*.¹ If we assume things which are merely

¹ Kant has hitherto used the word *Erscheinungen*, *appearances*, as the German synonym. As there is no danger of error in using phenomena in English, and as there is no other naturalized term which fully corresponds to it, I have preferred using it

objects of the understanding, and might be given to some other, say intellectual, intuition, these *intelligible* (as opposed to *sensible*) things should be called *noumena*. At first sight it might be supposed that the very limited notion of phenomena established in the Aesthetic indicated plainly the objective reality of *noumena*, as distinguished, not logically, by greater and less clearness of knowledge, but generically.¹ For if the senses only represent things *as they appear*, some other sort of knowledge should be at least possible, which should comprehend them *as they are*, apart from our sensibility. This opens a new field, a world of thought apart from sense, nay, perhaps, even intuited, as Schelling afterwards maintained, by some intellectual intuition. There is indeed, as has been shown in the Analogy of Permanence, something permanent conceived, as distinct from our representations, and to which they all refer. This is however an *x*, or unknown quantity, which brings our unity of apperception into connexion with the unity of diversity in sensuous intuition. Accordingly, this transcendental object is inseparable from sensuous data, without which it would never have come into our minds. It is merely the representation of pheno-

throughout the former part of the work. *Appearance* seems to me to imply illusion, which would be quite false, according to Kant's notions.

¹ Misprinted *generally* in Vol. III., p. 223.

mena under the notion of object generally—a notion determined, or rendered definite, only by the diversity of the phenomena.

Why, then, have we not remained content with the substratum of sensibility, but added *noumena* to *phenomena*? Simply because no confusion was simpler, and because men could not rest satisfied with so negative a notion. When sensibility is removed, the understanding is still able to *think* by means of its forms, and these are naturally identified with the thing that appears, as opposed to the appearance. No doubt, the inference from phenomena to noumena is so far valid that it is necessarily suggested by phenomena. But this affords us a *negative* meaning for noumena—they are *not objects of sensuous intuition*. If we proceed to describe them positively as *objects of non-sensuous intuition*, we dogmatise as to whether there be intuition distinct from that with which we are endowed, and, moreover, as none of our Categories apply to such an intuition, even were it not imaginary, we cannot advance one step towards any knowledge of its objects.

Kant means by a *problematical* concept, ‘one that contains no contradiction; that is connected with other cognitions as a limitation of given concepts, but of which the objective reality cannot be in anywise known.’ Such is the notion of a *noumenon*. It is in itself not contradictory. It is neces-

sary to show the limits of sensuous intuition, and its objective validity; and indicates that there is a field to which that intuition does not extend. But yet its possibility cannot be made out, and though our understanding extends *problematically* farther than phenomena, there is no intuition or notion of an intuition, by means of which our understanding could be used *assertorically* beyond this field. The Noumenon is then a *limiting concept*, repressing the pretensions of sensibility, not invented at random, but necessarily and unavoidably connected with the limitation of sensibility.

Concepts may be divided into intellectual and sensuous, but we cannot admit a similar division of objects into *phenomena* and *noumena*, in a *positive sense*; we cannot even call the noumenon a peculiar *intelligible object* of our understanding; we should rather say that the understanding to which it belongs is itself a problem, of which we can never conceive the possibility.¹

¹ 'The notion of a noumenon is therefore no concept of an object, but the problem unavoidably connected with the limitation of our sensibility, viz., whether there may not exist objects quite independent of its intuition—a question which can only be vaguely answered, by saying that as our sensuous intuition does not apply to all things indiscriminately, there is room for more and for other objects, so that they cannot be absolutely denied, but neither, in the absence of any definite notion, can they be affirmed as objects for our understanding' (*Critick*, p. 206).

Kant objects to a recent use of (*mundus*) *sensibilis* and *intelligibilis*, whereby the sum total of phenomena, if intuited, is called the world of sense, if thought, as connected by rational laws, the world of reason.¹ The mere observation of the starry heaven would be the former, the system of Copernicus or Newton the latter. This is mere fencing with the real difficulty, which is to determine whether understanding or reason have any uses when their objects are no longer phenomena; a question quite beyond any astronomical theory, however scientific, and which we have answered in the negative. Such a distinction between things as they appear and as they are, is to be taken merely in an empirical sense, or within experience, and does not touch the question whether the pure understanding can give us objects. We have shown, however, that *sense* and *understanding* can only give us objects in *combination*, and that when isolated, their representations are for that purpose idle.

If any reader still feels any difficulty on the subject, Kant proposes to him his usual test: let him try to employ the pure Categories by themselves in framing a synthetical assertion, analytical propositions being of no avail for increasing our knowledge. Take for example: all that is here,

¹ *Verstandeswelt*, properly *world of understanding*; but this expression is not English.

exists as substance; or: all that is contingent exists as the effect of some other thing, which is its cause. Whence can he get, or how can he use these notions, apart from any reference to possible experience? Where is the medium (above, p. 45) in which they can be combined? If he cannot answer this difficulty, he must confess that the region of noumena is a mere vacuum, of use as a limit, but totally devoid of positive objects, and foreign to human cognition.

CHAPTER XVII.

APPENDIX *on the Ambiguity of the Concepts of Reflection, produced by a confusion of the empirical and transcendental use of the understanding.*

§ I. REFLECTION is not directly concerned with obtaining notions of objects, but is the mental attitude of discovering the subjective conditions by which we can attain notions. Of course, the first question which it raises is this: to what faculty is the notion due? Is it in sense, or in understanding, that notions are to be compared? Thus many a judgment is due to habit or inclination, and is assumed, for want of reflection, to originate in the understanding. Judgments which are immediately certain, like those of Mathematic, require no *investigation* of their truth, but even these, and *a fortiori* all others, require *reflection*, or a consideration of the faculty from which they arise. The act of making this comparison, and of distinguishing whether they arise from sensibility or understanding, Kant calls *transcendental Reflection*. The relations in which notions stand to one another in our mental states are those of *identity* and *diversity*, of *agreement* and

opposition, of *internal* and *external*, of *determinable* and *determining* (matter and form). It makes a great difference in what faculty these comparisons are carried out.

In seeking objective judgments we compare concepts, and thus we obtain universal judgments by means of their *identity*, we obtain particular by their *diversity*, we obtain affirmation by their agreement, &c. The concepts adduced might accordingly be called *concepts of comparison*. But if we look beyond mere logical form, to the content of the concept, we find that their relation to one another is not to be determined without regard to the faculty in which they arise, and thus before we use the mere comparison (or logical reflection) we must apply the transcendental reflection just described, which is the real basis of any objective comparison of notions. This imperative duty we shall now undertake, and apply it to the operations of the understanding.

§ 2. 1. *Identity and Diversity*. If an object be presented to us repeatedly (in space) with the same internal features, such as quantity and quality, then as an object of the pure understanding, it is always the same numerically identical thing, and not many; but as a phenomenon, the accurate comparison of our several notions of it is of no avail to prove its identity, for in spite of the most accurate sameness of internal qualities, the difference of place at the

same time suffices to prove numerical diversity. So from Leibnitz' point of view, who regarded phenomena as things *per se*, but confused by our senses, his Law of *indiscernibility* (*principium identitatis indiscernibilium*) was irrefragable. But we have shown that phenomena are objects of sensibility, and that the understanding is, as regards them, of empirical use only, and thus numerical diversity is given by space, of which the parts, however similar, can never be identical. Leibnitz, accordingly, was in error for want of employing transcendental reflection, and his law is no real law of nature. It is merely an analytical rule, when we compare things by mere concepts.¹

2. *Agreement and Opposition.* If reality be considered merely through the understanding (*realitas noumenon*), no conflict of realities can be conceived, as for example, that in which they mutually cancel each other, as: $3 - 3 = 0$. Among phenomenal realities this is of constant occurrence, such as opposing forces, or joys balancing sorrows. General

¹ I have brought together under this and the following heads the two repetitions of the argument in the *Critick*, pp. 196 and 202, and incorporated them with Kant's present statement, with the view (ever present to me) of curtailing the prolixity of his exposition. The reader will find that I have omitted no material point in any of these repeated discussions. There is no part of the *Critick* so prolix. Kant comes back over and over again to his refutation of Leibnitz with great complacency.

Mechanic even gives an *a priori* rule for the empirical conditions of this opposition, depending on *direction*, which is quite foreign to the transcendental notion of reality. Though Leibnitz hardly insisted upon this denial of opposition explicitly as a new principle, his followers expressly adopted it. They hold for example that all evil is nothing but the consequence of the limitations of creatures, negation being the only possible opposition to reality. In the same way they were able to unite all reality in *one* being, without fear of such reciprocal limitations as must take place in phenomena. They opposed to realities nothing but their logical negations.

3. *The Internal and External.* In an object of pure understanding that alone is truly internal which has no relation (as to existence) to anything different from it. The inner determinations of a phenomenal substance in space are on the contrary nothing but relations, and it is itself nothing but a mere complex of relations—such as attraction, repulsion and impenetrability; we know no other qualities which make up substance, as we find it in space, and they all relate directly to something apart from them. Such qualities will not serve for a substance as an object of pure understanding. The only internal accidents we can conceive are those given us by internal sense—either *thinking* or something analogous to it. Thus Leibnitz made of

all substances, which he regarded as *noumena*, simple subjects with a faculty of representation, and called them monads. Hence, too, he could not conceive the community of these substances as anything but a *pre-established harmony*, and rejected all physical influence. For as each substance is purely internal, it cannot be related to any other, and there must be some third thing causing them to correspond mutually, not by continual and special influence (the system of Divine assistance), but by their depending on an original cause, from which they obtain their existence and permanence, and with it their mutual correspondences.

4. *Matter and Form.* These are two concepts which are at the basis of all other reflection, so inseparably are they bound up with every use of the understanding. The former means the determinable, the latter its determination, both in transcendental meaning, abstracting from all other questions. The old Logicians called the universal *matter*, but the specific difference the *form*. In every judgment the given concepts are the matter, their relation by the copula the form of the judgment, and thus it is all through our thinking. Hence, according to the pure understanding, matter precedes form, and accordingly Leibnitz assumed first monads and an inner faculty of representation in them, and then based upon this their external relations and community. Space was only

possible as the relation of substances, and time as the connexion of them as reasons and consequences. This is correct enough if space and time were attributes of things *per se*. But as sensuous intuitions, which they are, the form of the intuition, or subjective constitution of sensibility, must precede sensation, or matter. Leibnitz then gave a false account of the peculiarity of these forms when he attributed it to the *confusion* of our notions about objects, so that we translated the mere dynamical relations of things into independent intuitions. Nay, he even wished to make his view, which could only suit noumena, valid for phenomena, which were to him cognitions differing from those of the understanding only by a lesser degree of clearness.

As Kant afterwards observes (p. 202) Leibnitz' whole system is based upon a manifest logical fallacy. For though by the *dictum de omni*, &c., everything that belongs to or contradicts any general concept, also belongs to or contradicts all the particulars contained under the concept, yet it is absurd to modify this principle so as to say that whatever is not contained in the general concept is not contained in the individuals or particulars under it, for in this consists the difference of the particular and the universal, that the former contains additional comprehension. Yet this is the fallacy on which Leibnitz built his system. Because two *notions* of things in general have no differences, therefore

the *things* themselves are really identical ; that is to say, the absence of distinctions, in the absence of intuition, is supposed to hold good when things come to be intuited. The same criticism is applied to all the other heads by Kant.

§ 3. *Remarks on the Ambiguity of the Concepts of Reflection.* When we have assigned to a notion its position in the sensibility or pure understanding, this may be called its *transcendental place*, and when this is generally done we have a *transcendental Topic*, like the *logical topic* of Aristotle, used by teachers and orators, which indicated under certain heads where they could find proper materials for the subject in hand.

The *transcendental topic*, however, contains merely the above-mentioned four heads of comparison and distinction. They differ from the Categories, in that they do not expound objects according to their several concepts, but rather expound, in all its variety, the comparison of representations, which precedes our notion of things. This comparison requires the reflection above described, otherwise we fall, as Leibnitz did, into a transcendental *amphiboly* of these concepts. Our principle has enabled us to analyse his famous *intellectual system of the universe*, and show that it depends on a fundamental confusion. ' Thus he *intellectualized* phenomena, as Locke *sensualized* the Categories according to his system of *noogony*, if I may so call it, in deriving them all

from reflection.’¹ Neither of these great men saw that the two faculties were distinct in kind, but only able to produce knowledge by conjoint action.

The practical result is as follows : Matter is the *substantia phenomenon*. I seek its inner qualities in all parts of space, and in all effects which can only be external intuitions. We have accordingly no absolute, but only a relative, internal, which consists of external relations. Any other internal is a mere hallucination, and no object for our understanding ; the transcendental object, which is at the basis of the phenomena, and which we call matter, being a mere something, which we could not even comprehend, were it described to us. In this sense, then, the complaint *that we cannot discover the internal constitution of things* is mere idle talk. Observation and analysis of phenomena penetrate into the secrets of nature, and how far this may be done in the lapse of time is hard to say. But (as Locke said long ago) such investigations will not bring us a whit nearer to the origin of our sensibility, its relation to things, and the transcendental ground of this unity. For even ourselves we know only through internal sense, and as phenomena. Hence our Critick of the process of reasoning by mere reflection is of

¹ This is the old and once received view of Locke’s philosophy, which has been exploded, at least in our University, by the teaching of Professor Webb (*Intellectualism of Locke, passim*).

great use and importance. For when we apply the notions gained by ordinary logical reflection to objects generally, without determining their sources, there forthwith appear limitations which distort the empirical use of them, and show that the representations of things in general are not merely *insufficient*, but even *self-contradictory*, apart from sensuous conditions.

§ 4. Before leaving the analytic, Kant adds a table which he considers desirable for completeness' sake. In the *Prolegomena*, he mentions (p. 111) that he did it to show how universally the Table of the Categories is applicable, seeing that the most abstract notions of something and nothing range themselves under these heads.

The highest concept usually set down in transcendental philosophy as a starting point is the division into the Possible and the Impossible. But this, as every division does, implies a concept to be divided, which is here the concept of *something* in general, taken problematically. To this corresponds the notion of *nothing*, of which the subdivisions here follow.

(1.) To the concept of all, many, and one is opposed that of *none*, which removes them, and is a concept without object, such as the *Noumena* above spoken of, which cannot be classed among possibilities, while on the other hand they cannot be

affirmed impossible. Such are imaginary forces assumed in nature, not self-contradictory, but not proveable. They are to be called *entia rationis*.

(2.) Negation or *nothing* may be the denial of reality, or of the absence of an object, such as cold, which is the negation of heat. This is a *nihil privativum*.

(3.) We may have the mere form of intuition without matter, such as pure space and time, which are mere formal conditions of something. Such a nothing is to be called *ens imaginarium*.

(4.) The object of a self-contradictory concept is of course *nothing*, and is impossible. This is a *nihil negativum*.

Thus we have NOTHING subdivided into (a) empty concepts without objects (*ens rationis*); (β) Empty object of a concept (*nihil privativum*); (γ) Empty intuition without object (*ens imaginarium*); (δ) Empty object without any concept (*nihil negativum*). (a) differs from (δ) by being not impossible. (β) and (γ) are on the contrary empty data for concepts. Pure form is not an object any more than negation.

I have now completed my analysis of the positive side of the great *Critick*. The reader who has had the patience to consider with care Kant's argument up to this point may expect to find his difficulties almost at an end. The Dialectic is so completely a consequence of the positive principles established in

the Analytic, that I shall content myself in the next volume with a much briefer exposition, delaying on some details which are perplexing, but referring constantly to the principles already laid down, which I shall presume to be now familiar to the student.

END OF VOL. I.

By the same Author.

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